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The Law and Economics of Wardrobe Malfunction
Keith Brown and Adam Candeub ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
Michael Powell, Chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) from 2001 to 2005, will likely be most remembered
for his controversial indecency enforcement actions against Howard
Stern’s radio show and Janet Jackson’s Super Bowl “wardrobe
malfunction.” 1 This legacy is probably deserved. In addition to these
high-profile enforcement actions, Michael Powell imposed a higher total
fine amount in 2004 for broadcast indecency than the amount imposed
during the previous ten years combined. 2
Many have alleged that Powell’s enforcement actions were
politically motivated stunts made on behalf of powerful special
interests. 3 Some have argued that the enforcement actions have had a
chilling effect on free speech in broadcasting. 4 A few have even
maintained that the FCC has used its licensure power to discourage
owners of television and radio stations from challenging its indecency

∗ Keith Brown is an economist at the Center for Naval Studies; Ph.D. Texas A&M; B.S.
Trinity College. Adam Candeub is an Assistant Professor of Law at Michigan State University
College of Law; J.D. University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. Yale University.
1. According to one trade newspaper, “‘The top issue [that Powell will be remembered for]
will be indecency, much to his chagrin,’ one industry insider, who requested his name be withheld,
told Satellite News.” Editorial, FCC Chairman Michael Powell Resigns, SATELLITE NEWS, Jan. 31,
2005, at 1; see also Editorial, Another Powell Departs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 2005, at A16 (“Mr.
Powell’s disappointing reign will be remembered for the extremes to which he went to punish what
he called indecency . . . .”).
2. John Dunbar, Indecency on the Air: Shock-Radio Jock Howard Stern Remains “King of
All Fines,” CENTER FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, Apr. 9, 2004, http://www.publicintegrity.org/
telecom/report.aspx?aid=239&sid=200.
3. See, e.g., Peter Johnson, Stern Says He’ll Push for Kerry, USA TODAY, July 1, 2004, at
D3; Editorial, Powell Overreacting to Indecency Issue, TELEVISION WEEK, Jan. 26, 2004, at 9.
4. See, e.g., Daniel Rubin, Bad Words for Bono and Stern, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 19, 2004,
at A5 (“The American Civil Liberties Union said the measure would ‘turn down the thermostat in an
already chilly atmosphere, deterring speech that is constitutionally protected.’”); see also Mark
Jurkowitz, Targeting Free Speech as Journalists Face the Courts, the FCC Clamps Down, and
Secrecy Grows, Is the First Amendment Under Attack?, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 7, 2004, at D1;
Editorial, Committed to the First Amendment, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 24, 2005, at 12.
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actions in court 5 —a Byzantine maneuver that allows congressmen and
FCC Commissioners to continue using the indecency enforcement
publicity that courts might otherwise stop.
The FCC’s enforcement process itself creates these problems and
suspicions. First, because the FCC does not monitor the airwaves but
instead relies upon citizen complaints to initiate enforcement, 6 particular
interest groups can dominate enforcement even though indecency
regulations are supposed to reflect “contemporary community
standards.” 7 According to a recent FCC estimate obtained by
Mediaweek, 99.9% of indecency complaints in 2003 were filed by the
Parents Television Council, an activist group with links to conservative

5. See Jeff Jarvis, Can the FCC Shut Howard Up?, NATION, May 17, 2004, at 11
(explaining that according to “Robert Corn-Revere—the First Amendment attorney who recently got
Lenny Bruce pardoned and who litigated against the Communications Decency Act . . . . ‘The FCC
has done its best to prolong the longevity of this doctrine by keeping it out of court’”).
Howard Stern has often claimed that the FCC uses its power over licensure to prevent
licensees from seeking judicial review of indecency actions. He recently repeated the claim as a
caller on a radio show featuring Michael Powell as a guest.
Stern: Fine after fine came and we tried to go to court with you to find out about
obscenity and what your line was and whether our show was indecent, which I don’t
think it is. And you do something really sneaky behind the scenes. You continue to block
Viacom from buying new stations until we pay those fines.
You are afraid to go [sic] court. You are afraid to get a ruling time and time again.
When will you allow this to go to court and stop practicing your form of racketeering that
you do by making stations pay up or you hold up their license renewal?
Powell: First of all, that’s flatly false.
....
Stern: You’re lying.
Ronn Owens (KGO radio broadcast Oct. 26, 2004), http://www.buzzmachine.com/
archives/2004_10_26.html#008280.
In addition, many claim that the FCC sits on agency reconsideration orders for the purpose of
delaying judicial appeal. See Stephen Labaton, Knowing Indecency Wherever He Sees It, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2005, at C1 (“The networks and affiliates have filed papers with the commission
seeking a rehearing on the three major indecency cases: the Janet Jackson incident at the Super
Bowl, Bono’s use of a profanity at the Golden Globe Awards and a racy episode of ‘Married by
America.’ But the agency has sat on those appeals, and may not issue rulings for months or longer.
As a practical matter, the inaction by the commission has prevented the networks from taking the
matter to court.”).
6. Industry Guidance on the Commission’s Case Law Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1464 and
Enforcement Policies Regarding Broadcast Indecency, 16 F.C.C.R. 7999, 8015 (2001) [hereinafter
Industry Guidance] (“The Commission does not independently monitor broadcasts for indecent
material. Its enforcement actions are based on documented complaints of indecent broadcasting
received from the public.”).
7. Whether speech is indecent depends, in part, on whether it is patently offensive according
to contemporary community standards. See infra Part II.
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political and religious organizations. 8 As this Article demonstrates,
increases in the number of FCC indecency actions have almost always
been in response to political pressures emanating from interest groups.
When coupled with the inherent vagueness of the indecency
standard, the manipulatable enforcement process inevitably leads to
claims of selective or arbitrary enforcement. It also leads to public choice
speculation that indecency enforcement is simply a vehicle to allow
politicians to further their own agendas. 9 Or, even more darkly, the
complaint process can be used simply as a signaling exercise whereby
certain political groups indicate to politicians their political clout in order
to influence issues unrelated to broadcast indecency. 10 Further, the
complaint process takes the FCC away from its stated purpose—
clarifying and rendering consistent the “community standards” that
underlie the indecency determination. Instead, the FCC’s complaint
process has confused the standard. After nearly a generation of modern
indecency enforcement, the standard is muddier than it was thirty years
ago.
This Article sets forth a new, market-based approach to indecency
regulation designed to avoid many of these problems and to permit the
emergence of decency standards that more accurately reflect those of the
community. Drawing on recent economic theory involving two-sided
markets, we propose a new market-based mechanism for indecency
regulation that avoids the pitfalls of the FCC’s current politicized
approach. Instead of focusing regulations on the broadcaster, this Article
advocates shifting the current regulatory scheme to market-based
regulation of the viewer-advertiser relationship. Specifically, this Article
proposes that the FCC require all programs to explicitly state the entities
that advertise with them and make that information easily accessible to
8. Todd Shields, Activists Dominate Content Complaints, MEDIAWEEK, Dec. 6, 2004, at 4.
(“Through early October, 99.9% of indecency complaints—aside from those concerning the Janet
Jackson ‘wardrobe malfunction’ during the Super Bowl halftime show broadcast on CBS—were
brought by the PTC, according to the FCC analysis dated Oct. 1.”).
9. Jonathan R. Macey, Winstar, Bureaucracy and Public Choice, in 6 SUPREME COURT
ECONOMIC REVIEW 173, 176 (Ernest Gellhorn & Nelson Lund eds., 1998). (“The theory of public
choice, also known as the economic theory of legislation, makes the same basic assumptions about
self-interest for politicians and bureaucrats that standard economic analysis makes for private sector
actors. . . . [M]arket forces provide strong incentives for self-interested politicians to enact laws that
serve private rather than public interests because . . . these private groups can provide politicians and
bureaucrats with the political support they need to serve their objectives of achieving re-election, or
of maximizing their bureaucratic turf.”).
10. See Eric A. Posner, Symbols, Signals, and Social Norms in Politics and the Law, 27 J.
LEGAL STUD. 765, 777 (1998).
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consumers. This approach would allow consumers to directly pressure
advertisers—who, in turn, could pressure broadcasters to air acceptable
programming. This mechanism would better reflect community standards
and encourage viewers to engage in a meaningful civic dialogue. The
proposed regulation would also enhance economic efficiency, a new
justification for media regulation not before considered by scholars. 11
This Article’s analysis questions the completeness of the currently
dominant legal justification for indecency regulation, the public trustee
doctrine. As set forth by both the Supreme Court and the FCC over
approximately the last seventy years, “the People” own the airways, and
they, through their elected officials and delegated agencies, condition the
granting of licenses to use the airways. 12 Consequently, broadcasters are
public trustees of the people’s airways. In exchange for the right to use
the airways, broadcasters must adhere to the obscenity and indecency
standards the FCC promulgates. 13
We argue instead that regulation must focus on advertisers because
they drive media markets. Broadcasters make their money from
advertising: the more viewers or listeners (a.k.a. “eyeballs”) they deliver
to advertisers, the more broadcasters can charge advertisers. The real
economic transaction is not between broadcasters and consumers as the
traditional regulatory framework assumes. Rather, consumers trade the
value of their time watching commercials in exchange for programming.
If FCC regulation takes into account both transactions, “eyeball owners”
will be able to better bargain with their advertisers in order to gain a

11. See, e.g., Matthew L. Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 990 (1989) (setting forth the scarcity, public trustee, and industry structure justifications for
media regulation).
12. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 394 (1969) (“Licenses to broadcast do not
confer ownership of designated frequencies . . . .”); THOMAS G. KRATTENMAKER & LUCAS A.
POWE, JR., REGULATING BROADCAST PROGRAMMING 157 n.54 (1994) (“[S]tations operating under
Government license are trustees of property, this property to be used for the benefit of the public.”
(quoting Federal Radio Commission, THIRD ANNUAL REP. 31 (1929))). Or, as Senator Clarence Dill,
a sponsor of the epochal 1927 Radio Act stated, “Of one thing I am absolutely certain. Uncle Sam
should not only police this ‘new beat’; he should see to it that no one uses it who does not promise to
be good and well-behaved.” C.C. Dill, A Traffic Cop for the Air, 75 AM. REV. REVS. 181, 181
(1927).
The “public trustee” basis for broadcast regulation is certainly not the only one used by the
Supreme Court and the FCC over the years; they have used others—most notably scarcity—but also
industry structure, access, and the protection of children. See Spitzer, supra note 11. Nonetheless, the
public trustee justification is one of the earliest justifications, and it has never been abandoned.
13. For discussion of the development and history of the quid pro quo, see infra Part II.A.
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more direct voice in determining programming content in return for
listening to their commercials.
By collecting and furnishing information in an easily accessible way
about what programs advertisers support, the FCC could lower the
transaction costs for viewers to communicate with or possibly put
pressure on firms that advertise on indecent programming. This viewerbased mechanism would better reflect “community standards” than the
FCC’s one-size-fits-all approach, which attempts to impose a national
indecency standard based on interest-group complaints. A market
approach also allows for localized determinations of indecency. Finally,
by gathering information on advertisers and making it public, the FCC’s
role would be analogous to that of the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) in ensuring the accuracy of food labeling for the purpose of
informing public debate. Both programs have demonstrated efficiency
gains by providing information to consumers.
Section II of this Article introduces the current state of the law and
regulation on broadcast indecency. Section III examines the statutory
history of indecency regulation and its judicial interpretation in an effort
to understand why enforcement has always concentrated on the viewerbroadcaster relationship. Section IV examines the modern history of
indecency enforcement and argues that indecency regulations, as
currently designed, are an invitation for arbitrary, partisan enforcement.
The basic structure of indecency enforcement and its focus on the
viewer-broadcaster relationship, with the FCC purporting to act on behalf
of the viewer, is arguably the cause for this faulty enforcement. Section
V introduces the theory of the two-sided market and explains its
application to broadcasting regulation. The Section goes on to examine
the FCC’s authority for imposing a viewer-advertiser regulation regime.
It argues that, due to the nature of media markets, the market acting
alone may not provide an optimal level of information. It also explains
how this proposal might work with or without the current regulatory
regime. Section V concludes by arguing that this new approach builds
civil society because it provides information for public discussion about
matters of interest to society as a whole.
II. CURRENT LEGAL STANDARDS AND THE COMPLAINT PROCESS
The following summarizes the existing legal standards for broadcast
decency established in statute, Supreme Court precedent, agency
regulations, and the FCC’s enforcement process.
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The FCC derives the authority to assess civil forfeitures (fines)
against broadcasters from § 1464 of Title 18 of United States Criminal
Code, pursuant to its own complaint process for indecent material. 14 In
relevant part, this statute states, “Whoever utters any obscene, indecent,
or profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined . . .
or imprisoned . . . or both.” 15
The FCC’s regulation of indecent broadcast was upheld despite a
First Amendment challenge in FCC v. Pacifica. 16 This famous case
arose after a radio station’s daytime broadcast of comedian George
Carlin’s “Seven Filthy Words” monologue. 17 The Court concluded that
speech transmitted over broadcast media, like television and radio, has
only limited First Amendment protection. Therefore, the FCC could
constitutionally regulate indecent speech in the broadcast context even
though indecent speech is not obscene and thus devoid of constitutional
protections. 18 The Court described indecency as “nonconformance with
accepted standards of morality,” 19 involving “patently offensive
reference to excretory and sexual organs and activities.” 20 The Court did
concede, however, that the concept of indecency “requires consideration
of a host of variables.” 21 The Court permitted this lower level of First
Amendment protection to speech uttered on broadcast for two reasons:
the uniquely pervasive presence that radio and television occupy in the
lives of people and the unique ability of children to access radio and
television broadcasts. 22
Section 73.3999 of the Code of Federal Regulations states, “No
licensee of a radio or television broadcast station shall broadcast . . . any
material which is indecent.” 23 The FCC currently defines indecency as
“language or material that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms

14. See Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(holding that the FCC has authority to sanction licensees for broadcast of indecent material).
15. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000). Obscene material is prohibited from being broadcast as it has
no constitutional protection. The U.S. Department of Justice prosecutes transmission of obscene
materials. See Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15 (1973).
16. 438 U.S. 726, 727–28 (1978).
17. Id. at 728–29.
18. Id. at 739–41.
19. Id. at 740.
20. Id. at 743.
21. Id. at 750.
22. Id. at 748–50.
23. 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2004).
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patently offensive as measured by contemporary community standards
for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs.” 24
The FCC uses a community standard that is not region-specific but rather
one that reflects the views of “an average broadcast viewer or listener” in
the United States. The FCC considers the allegedly indecent utterance in
context. 25 In making its indecency determinations, the Commission
relies on three factors:
(1) the explicitness or graphic nature of the description or depiction of
sexual or excretory organs or activities; (2) whether the material dwells
on or repeats at length descriptions or sexual or excretory organs or
activities; (3) whether the material appears to pander or is used to
titillate, or whether the material appears to have been presented for its
shock value. 26

The FCC does not monitor broadcasts for indecent material. There
are no bureaucrats on the federal payroll watching television all day
looking for “sexual or excretory organs.” Rather, the FCC relies on
complaints received from members of the public. These complaints must
include a tape of the offending program, the date and time of the
broadcast, and the call sign of the station involved. 27 Generally, the
Enforcement Bureau of the FCC will make a recommendation and decide
on an appropriate disposition, which might include denial of the
complaint, issuance of a Letter of Inquiry seeking further information,
issuance of a Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL) for monetary
forfeiture, or a formal referral to the FCC Commissioners. 28 If the
Enforcement Bureau issues an NAL, the licensee is allowed to respond.
The FCC may then impose a monetary penalty by issuing a forfeiture
order. 29 If a forfeiture order is issued, a licensee may seek

24. Industry Guidance, supra note 6, at 7999, 8000 (citing Enforcement of Prohibitions
Against Broadcast Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, 8 F.C.C.R. 704 n.10 (1993)).
25. Id. at 8002–03.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 8015.
28. Id. This procedure purports to be driven by the action of the Enforcement Bureau, which
is staffed by career bureaucrats, although political appointees sometimes commandeer the procedure.
See, e.g., Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden
Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975, 4980 (2004) (overriding career staff’s decision). There
are currently five FCC Commissioners. Typically, three of these belong to the party of the President;
the other two belong to the opposing party. See Federal Communications Commission, About the
FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2005).
29. Industry Guidance, supra note 6, at 8016.
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reconsideration from the FCC or refuse to pay the fine and challenge the
order directly in district court. 30
III. HISTORY OF THE INDECENCY PROHIBITION AND ITS UNDERLYING
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT MEDIA
MARKETS AND PUBLIC OWNERSHIP
This Section recounts the history of indecency regulation and
enforcement to show how and why the assumptions upon which
indecency regulation was based naturally focused the regulator on the
broadcaster-viewer relationship. As the preceding discussion suggests,
the FCC has been unable to create a coherent standard for enforcing
indecency. This failure stems from the public trustee assumption in the
enforcement of indecency standards: acting at the behest of the viewer,
the FCC attempts to determine what indecency is and then applies these
standards against the broadcaster. As a result, the FCC’s effort to define
indecency is easily politicized. This Section attempts to understand why
the FCC’s enforcement of indecency regulations fixed its gaze only on
the viewer and broadcaster.
A. The Radio Act of 1912
The Radio Act of 1912 31 represented Congress’s first foray into
federal broadcast regulation. It was passed to satisfy America’s
obligations under international treaty regarding ship, marine ship-toshore, and ship-to-ship radios 32 —an issue that became particularly
pressing due to the role that radio signaling confusion played in the
sinking of the Titanic. 33 The Act established federal authority to regulate
the airways. 34 Although the Act did not declare federal “ownership” of
the airways, it established that broadcasting was a privilege requiring

30. Id.
31. Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302.
32. Id. The International Wireless Telegraph Convention required the United States “to apply
the provisions of the present Convention to all wireless telegraph stations open to public service
between the cost and vessels at sea.” Art. 1, 27 Stat. 1565. See DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN
BROADCASTING 14 (Frank J. Kahn ed., 4th ed. 1984) (1969).
33. See KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 5–7 (detailing the Titanic disaster and
the subsequent genesis of broadcast regulation).
34. See THOMAS STREETER, SELLING THE AIR: A CRITIQUE OF THE POLICY OF COMMERCIAL
BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED STATES 78 (1996) (noting that the 1912 Act first asserted the
principle of federal limitations on spectrum access and characterized radio transmissions as a
privilege sanctioned by the government).
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federal permission. 35 Anyone with a radio transmitter—from
commercial stations to high school physics club members—could
transmit provided she sent a postcard to the Secretary of Commerce. 36
The Secretary lacked discretionary authority and had to issue a license to
anyone who met the statutory standards, which were minimal. 37 As
Thomas Hazlett wrote, “The federal government was asserting
ownership of the electromagnetic resource, but in a rather peculiar way:
the secretary took no payment and issued no exclusive frequency
rights.” 38
Strikingly, despite the almost commons management of the radio
spectrum under the Radio Act of 1912, the government still required that
users of the radio spectrum uphold decency standards. Thus, even at the
very infancy of federal ownership of the airwaves, the government
demanded decency standards, quid pro quo. In 1914, the Department of
Commerce published a pamphlet entitled “Radio Communication Laws
of the United States.” 39 Regulation 210 stated, “No person shall transmit
or make a signal containing profane or obscene words or language.” 40
According to historian Rivera-Sánchez, “It is not clear where this
regulation came from.” 41
Apparently this regulation was enforced, although the extent of
enforcement is unclear. 42 By the standards of the Howard Stern Show,
these complaints were generally tame. For instance, in 1920, amateur
licensee Edgar Ferguson received a warning that his license would be
suspended for three months if he continued to use the profane phrase “go

35. 37 Stat. 302.
36. Mark Goodman, Radio Act of 1927 as a Product of Progressivism, 2 MEDIA HIST.
MONOGRAPHS
2
(1999),
available
at
htt://www.scripps.ohiou.edu/mediahistory/
mhmjour2-2.htm. According to the New York Times, there were 733 public entertainment stations
and 18,119 amateur radio sending stations in operation in 1927. Hoover To Maintain Radio Status
Quo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1927, at 2.
37. Hoover v. Intercity Radio Co., 286 F. 1003, 1007 (D.C. Cir. 1925) (“It logically follows
that the duty of issuing licenses to persons or corporations coming within the classification
designated in the act reposes no discretion whatever in the Secretary of Commerce. The duty is
mandatory; hence the courts will not hesitate to require its performance.”).
38. Thomas W. Hazlett, The Rationality of U.S. Regulation of the Broadcast Spectrum, 33
J.L. & ECON. 133, 135 (1990).
39. Milagros Rivera-Sánchez, The Origins of the Ban on Obscene, Indecent or Profane
Language of the Radio Act of 1927, 149 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. MONOGRAPHS 1, 7 (1995).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 8.
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to hell” on the air. 43 On the other hand, a transmission between two
sailors discussing the comparative services available from prostitutes at
several ports would be racy by twenty-first century standards. 44 It should
be noted that all recorded examples of enforcement involved point-topoint communications, as opposed to broadcast content intended for a
mass audience. 45 Rivera-Sánchez speculated that “[t]he scarcity of
documented complaints about the use of offensive speech in radio
broadcasting may have been the result of broadcasters’ respect for their
heterogeneous audience.” 46
B. Passage of the 1927 Radio Act and the Federal Radio Commission
1. Broadcast regulation prior to the 1927 Radio Act
Throughout the 1920s, the country experienced the rapid growth of
radio broadcasts. By 1922 there were 576 broadcast stations, and the
numbers increased throughout the decade. 47 Of course, when price is
zero, demand is infinite. In industry and Washington policy circles, the
fear became rampant that the airways had became a Tower of Babel. 48
For instance, a commentator in the industry magazine Radio Broadcast
wrote, “Freedom of the air does not require that everyone who wishes to
impress himself on the radio audience need have his private microphone
to do so.” 49 He added, “Radio waves cannot be freely used by everyone.
Unlimited use will lead to its destruction.” 50
Herbert Hoover, already an internationally known figure due to his
relief work in Europe after the First World War, was serving as Secretary
of Commerce at the time. An engineer by training, he realized the
importance, power, and potential of commercial broadcasting. He
“remolded the Radio Act from its origins and emphasis on wireless
point-to-point telegraphy to one that fostered a wider use of the newly
emerging technology.” 51 His problem was that the 1912 Act did not give
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 10.
46. Id.
47. Hazlett, supra note 38, at 139.
48. See ERIK BARNOUW, A TOWER IN BABEL: A HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED
STATES (1966).
49. J.H. Morecraft, The March of Radio, RADIO BROADCAST, Apr. 1926, at 555.
50. Id. at 475.
51. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 7.
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him sufficient power to impose restrictions on broadcasts or even
reallocate the spectrum.
Hoover initiated radio conferences in 1922, 1923, 1924, and 1925 for
the purpose of creating consensus on the technical and policy aspects of
radio regulation. 52 Attracting industry leaders, political figures, and
technical experts, each of these conferences set forth plans for more
comprehensive regulation of the airwaves and proposed draft legislation
to enact these plans. 53 Unfortunately, these well-considered plans did not
prompt Congress to act.
Perhaps sensing that mere conferencing would not bring
congressional action, Hoover precipitated events. Several federal court
decisions also helped push the need for broadcast regulation to
Congress’s attention. In 1923, the D.C. Court of Appeals, in Hoover v.
Intercity Radio Co., made clear that the Secretary of Commerce did not
have the authority to withhold a license from a qualified applicant but
could only select times and wavelengths to minimize broadcast
interference. 54 Despite the ruling, Hoover continued to refuse certain
applications for radio licenses. 55 In a 1926 decision, United States v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 56 a United States district court further limited the
Secretary of Commerce’s power, ruling that he lacked the authority both
to refuse to issue licenses and to select times when broadcasters could
broadcast.
In reaction to Zenith, Hoover refused to regulate broadcast and
essentially ended all licensing by the Department of Commerce. 57 This
inaction produced a crisis. 58 No new licenses were issued, and no
regulations were issued to address interference concerns. This forced
Congress to act, which is what Hoover and the radio industry wanted. 59
As a result, President Calvin Coolidge signed the Radio Act of 1927,
which gave the newly established Federal Radio Commission (FRC) the
authority to assign and revoke radio licenses. 60

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 8–11.
Id.
286 F. 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 11.
12 F.2d 614 (N.D. Ill. 1926).
KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id. at 7–16; Hazlett, supra note 38, at 159.
Radio Act of 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162.
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2. Ownership assumptions underlying the Radio Act of 1927
With the Radio Act of 1927, Congress made clear that use of
spectrum was quid pro quo: Broadcasters could use their assigned
spectrum in exchange for fulfilling their “public interest” obligation. The
contemporary meaning of public interest was rather vague. Senator Dill,
the author of the Act, said perhaps hyperbolically, that the public interest
“covers just about everything.” 61 Regardless of the exact parameters of
public interest, it was clear that Congress expected something in return
for the privilege of broadcasting.
The notion that government owned the air and had a right to demand
a quid pro quo for usage was well established in the Act itself and in the
discussion surrounding it. At the November 1925 Radio Conference,
Hoover stated,
Some of our major decisions of policy have been of far-reaching
importance and have justified themselves a thousand-fold. The decision
that the public, through the Government, must retain the ownership of
the channels through the air with just as zealous a care for open
competition as we retain public ownership of our navigation channels
has given freedom and development in service that would have
otherwise been lost in private monopolies. 62

Fundamentally, the Act “bluntly declared that there could be no
private ownership of the airwaves; they were public and use could occur
only with the government’s permission.” 63 Maine Congressman Wallace
White, a sponsor of the 1927 Act, expressed the typical view that
[w]e have reached the definite conclusion that the right of all of our
people to enjoy this means of communication can be preserved only by
the repudiation of the idea underlying the 1912 law that anyone who
will may transmit and by the assertion in its stead of the doctrine that
the right of the public to service is superior to the right of any
individual to use the ether. 64

Senator Dill stated, “The one principle regarding radio that must be
adhered to, as basic and fundamental, is that the Government must

61. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 20.
62. C.M. Jansky, Jr., The Contribution of Herbert Hoover to Broadcasting, 1 J. BROAD. 241,
248 (1957).
63. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 12 (citing 44 Stat. 1162 (1927)).
64. 69 CONG. REC. H5479 (1926).
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always retain complete and absolute control of the right to use the air.” 65
A contemporary commentator asserted that the idea that the government
“owns the ether” was an idée fixe in the congressional debate. 66
According to Powe and Krattenmaker,
Although the 1912 Act had required a license to use the air, it had been
silent on the issue of ownership of the airwaves. The 1927 Act was not.
It bluntly declared that there could be no private ownership of the
airwaves; they were public and use could occur only with the
government’s permission. 67

Interestingly, prior to passage of the Act, Congress enacted a
measure designed to ensure that no private entity could claim private
ownership over any portion of the airwaves. Senate Joint Resolution 125,
signed by President Coolidge, required that any applicant for a license or
license renewal had to “execute in writing a waiver of any right or any
claim to any right, as against the United States, to any wave length or to
the use of the ether in radio transmission because of previous license to
use the same or because of the use thereof.” 68
As Powe and Krattenmaker highlight, broadcasters were involved in
a quid-pro-quo exchange. Hoover understood that in exchange for a
license, the government would want something in return: “[I]t becomes
of primary public interest to say who is to do the broadcasting, under
what circumstances, and with what type of material.” 69 Congressman
White stated that the Radio Act of 1912 allowed an individual to
“demand a license whether he will render service to the public there
under or not.” 70 The 1927 Act, however, created a requirement of public
service in exchange for a license. 71
Finally, in 1928, the Federal Radio Commission concisely
characterized the right to broadcast as a quid pro quo. Its second annual
report stated that “the Commission must determine from among the
applicants before it which of them will, if licensed, best serve the public.

65. Dill, supra note 12, at 184.
66. Note, Federal Control of Radio Broadcasting, 39 YALE L.J. 245, 250 (1929).
67. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 12 (citing 44 Stat. 1162).
68. S.J. Res. 125, 69th Cong., 44 Stat. 917 (1926).
69. KRATTENMAKER & POWE, supra note 12, at 19 (citing Daniel E. Garvey, Secretary
Hoover and the Quest for Broadcast Regulation, 3 JOURNALISM HIST. 66, 67 (1976)).
70. Wallace H. White, Unscrambling the Ether, LITERARY DIGEST, Mar. 5, 1927, at 7.
71. Id.
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. . . Those who give the least, however, must be sacrificed for those who
give the most.” 72
C. Obscenity, Indecency, and the Public Interest Standard
Section 28 of the 1927 Act included prohibitions against the
broadcast of obscene, indecent, and profane speech. Congress
empowered the newly formed FRC to prosecute “whoever utters any
obscene, indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication.” 73 Adopting the recommendations of the Fourth
National Radio Conference in 1925, the Act further stated that
[n]othing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the
licensing authority the power of censorship over the radio
communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed by the licensing
authority which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means of
radio communications. 74

This statutory juxtaposition between prohibitions on certain types of
speech next to sections prohibiting censorship seems jarring. Arguably,
the language simply reflects a different historical mindset. At the time,
censorship had a more proscribed meaning that focused on government
review of political speech. 75 That the statute’s framers did not view
restrictions on obscenity, indecency, and profanity as censorship
probably reflected an unstated societal consensus that constitutional
protections should be exercised only within the confines of public
propriety. Indeed, in the 1910s and 1920s, only the minority view—often
expressed in Supreme Court dissents—held that the First Amendment
barred censorship of expression. 76
To those involved in the Act’s passage, the obscenity, indecency, and
profanity language probably seemed like a natural extension of the
public-interest standard. Senate sponsor Senator Dill stated, “Of one
72. Statement of the Commission, Aug. 23, 1928, reprinted in FEDERAL RADIO
COMMISSION, SECOND ANN. REP. 166, 170 app. F (1928).
73. 47 U.S.C. §§ 81–83 (repealed 1934).
74. Pub. L. No. 69-632, § 29, 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
75. David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of
Free Speech in American History, 45 STAN. L. REV. 47, 55–67 (1992).
76. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (upholding conviction for
distributing leaflets critical of the United States and its war policies). Justice Holmes dissented,
arguing that the First Amendment rendered unconstitutional the statute under which the defendants
were convicted and urged a “free trade in ideas.” Id. at 630.
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thing I am absolutely certain. Uncle Sam should not only police this
‘new beat’; he should see to it that no one uses it who does not promise
to be good and well-behaved.” 77 This position was clear to those who
first supported radio regulation. For instance, in Herbert Hoover’s
address to the Third Radio Conference of 1924, he stated:
Through the policies we have established the Government and therefore
the people, have today the control of the channels through the ether just
as we have control of our channels of navigation . . . . We will maintain
them free . . . but we must also maintain them free of malice and
unwholesomeness. 78

Perhaps due to the unstated societal consensus that free speech over
broadcast had to exist within standards of propriety, the indecency
sections were mentioned only in passing in the legislative history. 79 For
instance, in Pacifica, the Supreme Court made much of the legislative
silence on section 28 of the 1927 Act, stating that the obscenity and
decency provision “was discussed only in generalities when it was first
enacted.” 80 To some degree, this legislative silence justified the Pacifica
Court’s willingness to craft its own definition of indecency as a concept
separate and distinct from “obscenity.”
An analysis of contemporaneous statutes and draft legislation
suggests that the Pacifica Court was incorrect when it defined indecency
and obscenity differently. Statutes on the books contemporaneously with
the Act use obscenity and indecency synonymously. For instance, the
Comstock Act of 1872 prohibited the mailing of obscene materials. 81 It
read, “[N]o obscene book, pamphlet, picture, print, or other publication
of a vulgar or indecent character . . . shall be carried in the mail . . . .” 82
Early court decisions interpreting the Comstock Act did not distinguish
obscenity from indecency. 83 For example, a federal court in Indiana
stated that indecency was a general category encompassing obscenity. 84
Further, the 1912 Act and the 1914 Commerce Department regulations

77. Dill, supra note 12, at 181.
78. Jansky, supra note 62, at 248.
79. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 738 (1978).
80. Id.
81. 17 Stat. 283 § 148 (Jun. 8, 1872).
82. Id.
83. See, e.g., United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1930); Parmelee v. United States,
113 F.2d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1940).
84. United States v. Males, 51 F. 41 (D. Ind. 1892).
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prohibited “obscene and profane” utterances without distinguishing
between the two. 85
Milagros Rivera-Sánchez suggests that the 1927 Radio Act language
was largely lifted from the Commerce Department pamphlet of 1914,
Regulation 210 discussed above. 86 The First Radio Conference produced
a draft radio bill dated April 18, 1922; section 3(E)(e) of the document
states that an operator’s license shall be suspended if he “has transmitted
superfluous signals, or signals containing profane or obscene words or
language.” 87 This language exactly matches the Commerce Department
pamphlet. When Senator Clarence Dill introduced H.R. 9971, however,
he “inverted the order of the terms profane and obscene and added the
word ‘indecent.’” 88 There is no stated reason why Senator Dill did this
and thus very little one can conclude about the significance of the
revision. This version with slight changes was adopted into the 1927 Act.
This interesting historical footnote suggests that the Pacifica opinion
was probably incorrect in claiming that indecency and obscenity referred
to different concepts. Certainly, there is no evidence that the statute’s
drafters thought the two words had distinct meanings. Rather, the
evidence, slim as it is, suggests that the congressmen envisioned
prohibitions on one unitary category of inappropriate speech.
D. The 1934 Act and the Federal Communications Commission
Dissatisfied with the FRC, President Roosevelt sought to create a
federal agency with power over both wire and radio companies. After
considerable wrangling over whether spectrum would be allocated to
nonprofit and special interest groups, Congress passed the 1934
Communications Act. 89 It established the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) and transferred authority over spectrum decisions
from the FRC to the FCC. The radio provisions in Title III of the new
Act were essentially the same as those in the 1927 Act, thus affirming the
government ownership of all broadcasting rights and the public trustee
concept. 90

85. Rivera-Sánchez, supra note 39, at 19.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 20.
89. Robert D. Richards, Resurrecting the Fairness Doctrine: The Quandary of Enforcement
Continues, 37 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 557, 660 (1989).
90. Id.
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The 1934 Act also adopted the 1927 Act’s obscenity, indecency, and
profanity language, largely verbatim. 91 There was little legislative
history discussing the incorporation of such language into the new
legislation. The ban on obscene, indecent, and profane language was
amended in 1948 and replaced with criminal penalties for using such
language over the airwaves. The modified clause was struck from the
Communications Act and incorporated into the Criminal Code where it is
found today. 92 Despite the recodifications, the language remains largely
identical today. 93
E. Conclusion
The obscenity and indecency prohibitions emerge from a legal
paradigm that sees the broadcaster and the government involved in an
exchange. The broadcaster gets, from the people through the FCC, a right
to use or license; in exchange, the people receive from the broadcaster
the promise to act as a trustee in the public interest. The FCC enforces
the agreement. From the very inception of radio, the trustee
responsibilities included the obligation to adhere to indecency and
obscenity prohibitions. In this way, the broadcasters became part of the
quid pro quo.
Thus, the entire thrust of the regulatory system has focused on the
broadcaster and its obligations towards the listener/viewer with the FCC
as enforcer. This analysis ignores the relationship between the viewer
and the advertiser and the ways this relationship can be included in the
regulatory structure. The next Section analyzes the skewed outcomes that
arise, in part, because regulatory focus is on the broadcaster-viewer
relationship.
IV. ENFORCEMENT ACTION
The existing legal structure for regulating indecency leads to
politicized enforcement, which blurs legal standards and chills free
expression. In general, FCC action against broadcast indecency has been
sporadic, intensifying during the administrations of Republican

91. Section 29 of the 1927 Radio Act was incorporated to the 1934 Communications Act at
section 326.
92. See 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1948).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000) (“Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or profane language by
means of radio communications shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years,
or both.”).
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Presidents, particularly Richard Nixon and George W. Bush, who
typically acted in response to pressure from social conservative groups.
This politicized pattern of enforcement has had little to do with defining
or clarifying either community standards of indecency or the
constitutional standard in Pacifica, which should control the FCC’s
indecency enforcement actions.
A. Early Enforcement Under the 1934 Act
The first notable FCC indecency action under the 1934
Communications Act 94 followed a pattern that seems remarkably
contemporary: a famous entertainer gave a performance that pushed the
envelope of accepted morality. Politicians fulminated, and the FCC
reacted.
In a 1937 NBC radio broadcast, the famous Mae West, playing a
rather provocative Eve, gave a slightly salacious radio performance
spoofing the Garden of Eden. 95 Responding to a significant public
94. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-614 (2000). The 1934 Act created the FCC and gave it enforcement
authority over broadcast. Id. § 151.
95. The Chase and Sanbourn Hour: Adam & Eve (NBC radio broadcast Dec. 12, 1937). The
program described West approaching a “palpitatin’ python,” (played by Edgar Bergman—although
some sources credit Ted Osborn with the role) and sending the snake to get an apple for her, leading
to this exchange:
SNAKE: I’ll—I’ll do it (hissing laugh)
EVE: Now you’re talking. Here—right between those pickets.
SNAKE: I’m—I’m stuck.
EVE: Oh, shake your hips. There, there now, you’re through.
SNAKE: I shouldn’t be doing this.
EVE: Yeah, but you’re doing all right now. Get me a big one . . . I feel like doin’ a big
apple . . . Mmm-oh . . . nice goin’, swivel hips.
Forty million people tuned into the show. According to historical reports, many found the dialogue
to be highly amusing, but there were also several thousand complaints.
Oddly, a feature appearing a few minutes later on the program, introduced by Don Ameche as
“the romantic battle of the century between Siren Mae West and Casanova Charlie McCarthy,”
featured West and Charlie McCarty engaged in a steamy dialogue—but did not elicit the same
outrage.
MAE: Nothin’ I like better than the smell of burnin’ wood!
CHARLIE: Wonder if she means me?
DON: Better watch out, Charlie!
BERGEN: Say, Charlie—do you smell that perfume? Isn’t it ravishing?
CHARLIE: Yeah! Yes it is—it’s ravishing! It’s weakening! So help me—I’m
swooooooning! Wooo wooo woooo! What is it?
MAE: Whyyyyy, it’s my favorite perfume: “Ashes of Men.”
CHARLIE: Uh-oh! “Ashes of Men?” Holy smoke! She’s not gonna make a . . . cinder . . .
outa me!”
Or:

1480

1CANDEUB.FIN.DOC

1463]

3/14/2006 5:09:54 PM

The Law and Economics of Wardrobe Malfunction

outcry, Representative Lawrence Connery (D-MA) complained on the
House floor of “the ravishing of the American home” by West’s “foul,
sensuous, indecent, and blasphemous radio program,” which “reduced
the Garden of Eden episode to the very lowest level of bawdy-house
stuff.” 96 The FCC responded with a stern warning to NBC, and NBC
banned West and even the mention of her name. 97
Excepting the Mae West incident, FCC power to regulate broadcast
content was largely unused from the 1930s to the 1960s, with no notable
MAE: Listen, Charlie—are these your keys?
CHARLIE: Oh, uhhhh, thanks Mae—did I leave them in the car?
MAE: No—you left ‘em in my apartment!
(Bergen is outraged to learn of Charlie’s nocturnal activities—but Mae rises to his
defense.)
MAE: If you wanna know, he did come up to see me.
BERGEN: Oh, he did? And what was he doing up there?
MAE: Wellll . . . Charlie came up, and I showed him my. . . etchings. And he showed me
his . . . stamp collection.
BERGEN: Oh, so that’s all there was to it—etchings and a stamp collection!
CHARLIE: Heh, heh, heh—he’s so naive!
And more:
MAE: I thought we were going to have a nice long talk Tuesday night at my apartment!
Where did you go when the doorbell rang?
CHARLIE: I was gonna hide in your clothes closet—but two guys kicked me out!
And, of course:
BERGEN: Tell me, Miss West—have you ever found the one man you could love?
MAE: Sure . . . lotsa times!
As the dialogue proceeds, recordings of the program show a certain nervousness in the
response of the audience—there is a marked edginess to the laughter, which only becomes more
pronounced as the routine nears its climax:
MAE: You ain’t afraid that I’d do ya wrong? Orrrr . . . are ya afraid that I’ll do ya right?
CHARLIE: Well, I’m slightly confused. I need time for that one.
MAE: That’s all right—I like a man what takes his . . . time! Why doncha come up home
with me now, honey? I’ll let ya play in my . . . woodpile. (A very nervous laugh from the
audience is audible on this line.)
But Charlie won’t give in, and Mae finally gives him the brush-off:
MAE: I don’t need you! I got men for every mood—men for every day in the week—
Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, Friday—I change my men like I change my
clothes!
CHARLIE: Mae! Mae! You’re not walking out on me, are you?
MAE: I got a reputation at stake! No man walks out on me—they might carry them out,
but they never walk out!
Mae West ended up taking most of the heat, earning a ban from NBC that lasted for nearly twenty
years; her name was not even mentioned for over a decade. Standard Brands, the radio program’s
sponsor, issued a formal apology on the following week’s program. In a rather sexist result, Edgar
Bergen and Charlie McCarthy escaped unscathed and went on to star in the most popular act on
radio.
96. 83 CONG. REC. H561 (daily ed. Jan. 26, 1938) (statements of Rep. Connery).
97. EMILY W. LEIDER, BECOMING MAE WEST 342 (1997).
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actions for broadcast indecency during this time. Marjorie Heins stated
that “[FCC] power lay largely dormant in the 1950s.” 98 A legal
commentator wrote in a 1959 Harvard Law Review article that “[t]he
federal statutes which make it criminal to broadcast obscenity . . . have . .
. been almost completely ignored.” 99
This temporary abeyance stemmed from social and political, as well
as legal, causes. Many believe that the 1950s were a time of tremendous
conformity and cultural conservatism, and the broadcast media simply
responded to these strong cultural conventions. 100 Indeed, the few
indecency complaints filed and acted upon during this period appear
remarkably tame by current standards. For instance, the FCC initiated
action against Mile High Radio (KIMN) in 1958 for an announcer’s
comments, which included such inflammatory phrases as “flushing
pajamas down the toilet,” “inflating ‘cheaters’ with helium,” and “the
guy who goosed the ghost and got a handful of sheet.” 101 The Broadcast
Bureau (the office in the FCC that handled indecency complaints at that
time) and FCC chairman sought to revoke KIMN’s license, but the
majority of the Commission simply issued a cease and desist order. 102
Importantly, the Commission did not rely on section 1464’s explicit
obscenity and indecency prohibition in its KIMN indecency inquiry, but
rather on a more general public-interest standard. 103
Encouraging conservative approaches in broadcast, the National
Association of Broadcasters (NAB), the umbrella trade group of
television and radio stations, promulgated private industry censorship
codes for radio and television. These codes were in effect during the
1950s and 1960s. The private code prohibited broadcast of “offensive
language, vulgarity, illicit sexual relations, sex crimes, and abnormalities
during any time period when children comprised a substantial segment of
the viewing audience.” 104

98. MARJORIE HEINS, NOT IN FRONT OF THE CHILDREN: “INDECENCY,” CENSORSHIP, AND
92 (2001).
99. Note, State Regulation of Radio and Television, 73 HARV. L. REV. 386, 390 (1959).
100. See HEINS, supra note 98, at 98; see also DAVID HALBESTROM, THE FIFTIES (1993).
101. HEINS, supra note 98, at 92; see also Mile High Stations, Inc., 28 F.C.C. 795, 798 (1960).
102. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., AMERICAN BROADCASTING AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 166–67
(1987).
103. Mile High Stations, Inc., 28 F.C.C. at 797.
104. See BRUCE A. LINTON, SELF-REGULATION IN BROADCASTING 11–15 (1967).
THE INNOCENCE OF YOUTH
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B. Changing Times

Just as the 1960s marked a turning point in the political and legal
underpinnings of American society, the period marked a shift in
broadcast enforcement as well. The FCC’s action against “Uncle
Charlie,” host of the Charlie Walker Show, was a harbinger of things to
come. 105 “Uncle Charlie” used suggestive puns during his on-air
program, changing names of local places from “Andrews” to “Ann’s
Drawers” and “Bloomville” to “Bloomersville” and using phrases such
as “let it all hang out.” 106 In response, the FCC issued its first modern
denial of a license renewal on the basis of immoral broadcasting. 107 The
FCC ruled that WDKD subjected housewives, teenagers, and young
children to offensive remarks. 108 As with the Mile High enforcement
several years earlier, the Commission did not rely on section 1464’s
explicit obscenity and indecency prohibition but applied a more general
public-interest standard. 109
When Richard Nixon’s appointees assumed dominant positions at
the FCC in the late 1960s and early 1970s, indecency enforcement
accelerated. A January 1970 interview with Jerry Garcia provided the
FCC an opportunity to apply the obscenity and indecency prohibitions of
section 1464 directly. In an interview with Eastern Education Radio in
Philadelphia,
Garcia
used
the
words
“s——” and “f——”, mostly as adjectives, introductory phrases, or
“substitutes for ‘et cetera.’” 110 The Commission fined Eastern Education
one hundred dollars. 111
Between June 1972 and June 1973, there was a flood of complaints,
many in response to a new broadcast format sweeping the country called
“topless radio.” 112 Initially appearing in California, it typically featured
an announcer and a female call-in guest discussing sexual matters. 113
The FCC took action against WGLD-FM, owned by Sonderling
Broadcasting in Oak Park, Illinois, for a discussion of oral sex that
105. See HEINS, supra note 98, at 92–93.
106. Id. at 92
107. Id.
108. Palmetto Broad. Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962), aff’d sub nom. Robinson v. FCC, 334 F.2d
534 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
109. Id. at 258.
110. POWE, supra note 102, at 175.
111. Id. at 176
112. Id. at 182–83.
113. Id. at 182.
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included a recommendation for performing it “when you’re driving” to
take “the monotony out of things.” 114 At the time, the Commission had
no explicit regulatory standard for either obscenity or indecency. It only
had the statutory mandate in § 1464 prohibiting broadcast of “obscene,
indecent, or profane” material. 115
The Commission declared the program obscene and fined the station
$2,000. 116 To reach this conclusion, it relied on the Supreme Court’s
three-prong test for obscenity first expressed in Roth v. United States 117
and later refined in Memoirs v. Massachusetts. 118 Following the Court’s
standard, the Commission found the broadcast obscene because (1) the
dominant theme of the material appealed to the prurient interest, (2) the
material was patently offensive by contemporary community standards;
and (3) the material was without redeeming social value. 119 The D.C.
Circuit affirmed the decision in Illinois Citizens Committee for
Broadcasting v. FCC. 120
While Illinois Citizens was on appeal, New York City’s WBAI aired
a monologue that was destined to shape broadcast content regulation to
this day. On Tuesday, October 30, 1973, WBAI played a twelve-minute
sequence from George Carlin’s album “Occupation: Foole,” about fourletter words and the seven words “you couldn’t say on the public . . .
airwaves.” 121 The program was originally produced by Pacifica
Radio. 122
The Commission received a complaint from a man, who, in the
words of the Supreme Court:
stated that he had heard the broadcast while driving with his young son
[and] wrote a letter complaining to the Commission. He stated that,
although he could perhaps understand the “record’s being sold for
private use, I certainly cannot understand the broadcast of [the] same
over the air that, supposedly, you control.” 123

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
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Id.
18 U.S.C. § 1464 (2000).
Sonderling Broad. Corp., 41 F.C.C.2d 919, 920 (1973).
Id. (quoting Roth, 354 U.S. 476, 489 (1957)).
Id. (quoting Memoirs, 383 U.S. 413, 418 (1966)).
Id.
515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
POWE, supra note 102, at 185–86; FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 729 (1978).
Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729–30.
Id. at 730.
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In fact, the complainant was John R. Douglas, a member of the
national planning board of Morality in Media, a conservative
organization founded by a Jesuit priest in 1962. 124 As Lucas Powe
argues, Douglas was not the typical Pacifica listener, and his complaint
appears to have been a calculated effort to achieve certain legal and
political aims. 125 Powe points to Douglas’s six-week delay in submitting
his complaint and his description of his fifteen-year-old son as his
“young son” as evidence that Douglas probably did not even hear the
broadcast. 126
Regardless of the facts, Douglas’s efforts had their policy effects:
ever since the Douglas complaint, the use of the complaint process by
special interest groups to achieve political aims has been a constant in
broadcast content regulation. Reacting to the Pacifica complaint, FCC
Chairman Richard “Dick” Wiley prophesied threateningly about further
regulation unless broadcasters showed “taste discretion and decency.” 127
Congress made noises urging further FCC action against indecency.
These looming threats of regulation resulted in a 1975 TV agreement
among the FCC and broadcasters for a family viewing hour. 128
Legally, the complaint had an even greater effect. The FCC’s
decision was reversed by the D.C. Circuit, and the FCC then appealed to
the Supreme Court. The Court issued the famous FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation decision that continues to form the basis of broadcast
regulation to the present day. 129 The decision articulated the difference
between indecency and obscenity, giving the FCC the power to regulate
indecency. 130
C. Post-Pacifica and the Brief Reign of the Seven Dirty Words
After Pacifica, the FCC did not rush to enunciate a standard of
indecency based upon the broad definitions set forth in the Supreme
Court opinion. Rather, it simply enforced the rule—never explicitly

124. POWE, supra note 102, at 186; see also Morality in Media, Inc.,
http://www.moralityinmedia.org (last visited Nov. 3, 2005).
125. POWE, supra note 102, at 186.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 187.
128. Pacifica Found., 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975), rev’d sub nom. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556
F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev’d sub nom. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
129. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726; Kevin J. Martin, Family-Friendly Programming: Providing
More Tools for Parents, 55 FED. COMM. L.J. 553, 558 (2003).
130. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 740.
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stated in Pacifica but certainly proceeding from a conservative reading of
it—that seven dirty words (and a few others) were prohibited from being
spoken on the air before 10:00 p.m. 131 The FCC narrowly construed
Pacifica to mean that indecency did not extend beyond the seven dirty
words (and a few others).
This hands-off regulation continued during the chairmanship of
Reagan appointee Mark Fowler. 132 He was a deregulation crusader and
was personally loath to involve the Commission in any sort of broadcastcontent regulation. At one time he stated, “[I]f you don’t like it, just
don’t let your kids watch it.” 133 Although in the years preceding 1986,
the FCC annually received approximately 20,000 complaints alleging
obscenity or indecency, it failed to act on any of them. 134
However, Fowler’s hands-off strategy did not sit well with numerous
conservative groups, including Morality in Media—the catalyst in the
Pacifica case. Shortly after Fowler’s renomination in June 1986,
Morality in Media initiated a picketing campaign at the FCC. Along with
groups like the National Decency Forum, it also wrote hundreds of letters
to the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
opposing Mr. Fowler’s renomination. 135 The Reverend Donald
Wildmon, Executive Director of the National Federation of Decency,
called upon his supporters “to oppose Mr. Fowler’s renomination
because he had done ‘nothing, zero, zilch’ about indecency during his
tenure.” 136
These groups applied direct pressure to the FCC as well. In early
July 1986, Chairman Fowler met with Brad Curl of the National Decency
Forum, who met thereafter with the FCC’s General Counsel, Jack

131. HEINS, supra note 98, at 104; see also Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 930–
31 (1987).
132. Mark Conrad, Constitutionality of FCC’s New Indecency Rules, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 17, 1990,
at 5 (“F[rom] 1975 to 1987, peace reigned on the airwaves as a policy of ‘benign neglect’
occurred.”); Alex S. Jones, F.C.C. Studies ‘Indecency’ on Radio, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 1986, at A1
(“The commission has not sent such [inquiries about indecency] since 1978 . . . . Under Presidents
Carter and Reagan, the commission has strongly advocated a hands-off attitude regarding broadcast
programming of all kinds.”).
133. HEINS, supra note 98, at 109 (quoting ROBERT LIEBERT & JOYCE SPRAFKIN, THE EARLY
WINDOW: EFFECTS OF TELEVISION ON CHILDREN AND YOUTH 50 (3d ed. 1988)).
134. John Crigler & William J. Byrnes, Decency Redux: The Curious History of the New FCC
Broadcast Indecency Policy, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 329, 344–45 (1989).
135. Id. at 344.
136. Id.; see also HEINS, supra note 98, at 112; Bob Davis, FCC Chief Shifts Obscenity View
as He Seeks Job Reappointment, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1986, at 44.
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Smith. 137 In a letter dated July 9, 1986, Mr. Curl advised the Chairman
that, on the basis of their discussion, his organization would discontinue
the planned picketing for the following week. 138 The letter stated that the
FCC General Counsel had agreed to “cooperate on some decency actions
and some further investigations of our point of view.” 139 Curl declared,
“I agree that the citizens have not been bringing you enough complaints,
and I will take action to publicize the need for more documented citizen
complaints.” 140 In the letter, Curl acknowledged Mr. Smith’s willingness
“to cooperate on a few ‘send a message’ cases.” 141 On July 21, 1986,
Curl, this time joined by Paul McGeady of Morality in Media, had
another meeting with Chairman Fowler. 142 A couple of days later,
Morality in Media sent the FCC a memorandum outlining a legal
campaign to censure “indecent” programming. 143 Application of this
pressure soon brought positive results for groups such as Morality in the
Media and the National Federation of Decency.
D. The End of the Reign of the Seven Dirty Words and
the Broadening of the FCC’s Indecency Approach
Under pressure from socially conservative groups, the FCC
responded with three indecency actions in the course of four months.
First, Morality in Media gave the FCC General Counsel tapes of a
Howard Stern show aired on WYSP-FM in Philadelphia. 144 In response,
the FCC sent an indecency inquiry to Infinity Broadcasting Corporation,
licensee of WYSP-FM. 145 The FCC’s inquiry focused on Howard
Stern’s morning show and its sexual banter. 146
Second, Nathan Post complained to the FCC about the song Makin’
Bacon played over the University of California station, KCSB-FM Santa

137. Davis, supra note 136, at 44.
138. HEINS, supra note 98, at 112 (citing Letter from Brad Curl, National Director, Morality in
Media, to Mark Fowler, Chairman, FCC (July 9, 1986)).
139. Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 134, at 345.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 345.
143. Id. (citing Letter from Paul J. McGeady, General Counsel, Morality in Media, to John B.
Smith, General Counsel, FCC (July 23, 1986)).
144. See Davis, supra note 136, at 44.
145. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R. 2703 (1987); Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 2
F.C.C.R. 2705 (1987).
146. Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705.
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Barbara. 147 He then wrote to the Parents Music Resource Center, 148 an
action that led to direct White House involvement. 149 He said in a
newspaper interview, “It shocked me when, kaboom! they took my letter
to the White House and sent Patrick Buchanan to the FCC where he read
them the riot act.” 150 Responding to Post’s and other listeners’
complaints, the FCC sent an inquiry to KCSB-FM, Santa Barbara on
September 22, 1986. 151
Third, on September 1, 1986, Larry Poland lodged a complaint
against Pacifica station KPFK 152 for a post-10:00 p.m. broadcast of
excerpts from a sexually graphic play, Jerker. 153 A short while later, the
FCC’s General Counsel called to tell Mr. Poland that the FCC had
decided to “take this one all the way to the Supreme Court” and that
Poland was “going to be famous.” 154 That fall, the FCC advised KPFKFM radio, Los Angeles, that it had received complaints about “obscene
or indecent programming broadcast during the evening hours on Station
KPFK-FM.” 155 The FCC directed the Chairman of Pacifica to comment
on the attached complaints within thirty days. 156
These actions were not simply cosmetic political maneuverings.
Particularly after Chairman Fowler’s departure from office in the spring
of 1987, they represented a real shift in indecency policy away from the
minimalist “seven dirty words” approach to a more general standard of
indecency. 157 On April 29, 1987, the FCC promulgated orders against
147. Dennis McDougal, He’s a Crusader Against Indecency, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1987, § 6,
at 1.
148. The Parents Music Resource Center was made prominent by Tipper Gore’s campaign to
label albums on the basis of the explicitness of their lyrics. Id.
149. McDougal, supra note 147, at 1.
150. Id.
151. See Infinity Broad. Corp., 2 F.C.C.R. 2705; Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 2 F.C.C.R.
2703.
152. See Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 134, at 348 (citing Letter from Larry W. Poland,
President, Mastermedia International, Inc., to Mark Fowler, Chairman, FCC (Sept. 1, 1986)).
153. Dennis McDougal, How ‘Jerker’ Helped Ignite Obscenity Debate, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1987, at 1.
154. Mr. Poland also repeated the story in a television interview broadcast nationwide. See
Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 134, at 346 (citing McNeil Lehrer News Hour: Expletive Deleted (PBS
television broadcast Nov. 24, 1987)).
155. Crigler & Byrnes, supra note 134, at 346.
156. Id.
157. The irony of Fowler’s departure coinciding with a reemergence of aggressive broadcast
regulation was not lost by contemporary commentators:
When the Federal Communications Commission declared last week that it was going to
crack down on sexually explicit language in broadcasting, it was slapping itself on the
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these three licensees, 158 as well as a Public Notice announcing that the
indecency policies articulated in the orders were declaratory rulings with
binding precedential effect on all licensees. 159 Incoming FCC Chairman
Dennis Patrick stated explicitly that these rulings represented a sea
change in regulation. He said, “[W]hat we are doing today is to correct
an altogether too narrow interpretation of indecency.” 160
The Public Notice, as well as the three indecency orders, stated that
the FCC would abandon the limited definition of indecency as Carlin’s
seven dirty words and thereafter apply the generic definition of
indecency set forth in Pacifica. The FCC defined indecency as “language
or material that depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast
medium, sexual or excretory activities or organs.” 161 The FCC
announced a policy of channeling indecent broadcasting to times when
“there is not a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience.” 162
On June 1, 1987, the National Association of Broadcasters filed a
Petition for Clarification, and fourteen broadcasters and media
representatives jointly filed a Petition for Reconsideration of the April
29, 1987 Public Notice. 163 These groups did not question the
constitutional basis for the Public Notice. Instead, they sought numerous
revisions that would:
(1) provide more precise guidance as to the elements pertinent to
whether material is “patently offensive” and violates
“contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium”;
(2) consider the literary, artistic, political and scientific value of
programming in judging whether it is patently offensive and,
thus, indecent; (3) exempt news and informational programming
wrist. Or shooting itself in the foot . . . . In an ironic way, the dirty-words decision last
week is like the first coat of farewell tar-and-feathers for Fowler, who officially left
office on Friday.
Id. at 335 n.34 (citing Tom Shales, Fowler’s Way: Foul is Fair, WASH. POST, April 20, 1987, at B1).
158. New Indecency Enforcement Standards To Be Applied to All Broad. and Amateur Radio
Licensees, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726, 2727 (1987) [hereinafter New Enforcement Standards].
159. Id. at 2727.
160. Neil Borowski, FCC Targets ‘Indecent’ Broadcasts, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 17, 1987, at
A1.
161. New Enforcement Standards, supra note 158, at 2726 (citing Pacifica Found., 56
F.C.C.2d 94, 99 (1975), rev’d sub nom. Pacifica Found. v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977), rev’d
sub nom. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978)).
161. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726.
162. New Enforcement Standards, supra note 158, at 2726.
163. Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 930, 935 n.1 (1987).
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from a finding of indecency; (4) defer to reasonable good faith
judgments made by licensees applying the requirements set forth
by the Commission; (5) apply rulings prospectively, not
sanctioning licensees until they have notice that particular
material has been judged to be indecent; and (6) adopt a fixed
time of day after which non-obscene, adult oriented
programming may be aired, or articulate a similar “bright line”
test. 164
The Commission’s Reconsideration Order did a few of these things.
It established a definite time, 12:00 a.m., after which the indecency
regulations would not apply. 165 It also identified numerous factors that
would enter into an indecency judgment, such as the vulgar or shocking
nature of the words or depictions, the manner in which the language or
depictions were presented, the isolated or fleeting nature of the offensive
material, the medium’s ability to separate adults from children, the likely
presence of children in the audience, and the material’s artistic or literary
merit. 166 It also stated that “contemporary community standards” looked
to the national community, not the local broadcaster. 167
In Action for Children’s Television v. FCC (“ACT I”), a group of
petitioners, including Infinity Broadcasting and the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU), challenged the Reconsideration Order as
overly broad and unconstitutionally vague. 168 The D.C. Court of
Appeals rejected this challenge but found that the safe harbor times,
which prohibited broadcast of indecent materials between the hours of
6:00 a.m. and 12:00 a.m., were not sufficiently supported; thus, the court
remanded them for further reconsideration. 169
Congress did not like this result. In 1988, Senator Jesse Helms
introduced an appropriations rider requiring the FCC to set forth
regulations enforcing its indecency rules on a twenty-four-hour basis. 170
The D.C. Court of Appeals, in Action for Children’s Television v. FCC
164. Infinity Broad. Corp. of Pa., 3 F.C.C.R. 930, 931 (1987), aff’d in part, vacated in part
sub nom. Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
165. Id. at 934 (“[W]hereas previously we indicated that 10:00 p.m. was a reasonable
delineation point, we now indicate that 12:00 midnight is our current thinking as to when it is
reasonable to expect that it is late enough to ensure that the risk of children in the audience is
minimized . . . .”).
166. Id. at 932.
167. Id. at 933.
168. 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988), superceded in part, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
169. Id. at 1342, 1344.
170. Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2186, 2228 (1988).
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(“ACT II”), ruled that the amendment completely prohibiting indecent
speech was not sufficiently tailored to satisfy First Amendment
standards. 171 It rejected the FCC rule written to enforce the rider and
remanded the safe harbor issue to the FCC. 172
Congress again stepped in and passed the Public
Telecommunications Act of 1992. 173 The Act required the FCC to
reestablish a safe harbor for indecent speech from 12:00 a.m. to 6:00
a.m., with an exception for public broadcasters who could broadcast
indecent materials after 10:00 p.m. 174 In 1995, the D.C. Circuit in Action
for Children’s Television v. FCC (“ACT III”), found that, standing alone,
the 12:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m. prohibition was narrowly tailored to meet a
compelling public interest. 175 However, since the preferential treatment
for public television stations was not justified by a compelling state
interest, the court set aside the more restrictive 12:00 a.m. to 6:00 a.m.
prohibition. 176 This safe harbor provision is still in place in the FCC’s
regulations. 177
E. The FCC in the 1990s and the Powell Chairmanship
After ACT III finally clarified the extent of the FCC jurisdiction over
broadcast indecency, the FCC assumed a middle course in regulation.
Perhaps reflecting the more conservative, “Sister Souljah” 178 tendency
of the Clinton administration, the FCC leadership pursued indecency
complaints with notable, but limited, vigor, directing the lion’s share of
the total amount of fines to Howard Stern. 179 During the 1990s, the FCC
171. 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), superseded in part, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
172. Id.
173. Pub. L. No. 102-356, § 16, 106 Stat. 949 (1992).
174. Id.
175. 58 F.3d 654, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc).
176. Id. at 669.
177. See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3999 (2004).
178. See Ronald A. Taylor, Clinton Raps Sister Souljah’s Remarks, WASH. TIMES, June 14,
1992, at A4. Clinton lambasted rapper Sister Souljah for encouraging violence against whites. His
remarks increased his appeal to moderate voters, but alienated some political allies. The term has
since entered the political lexicon.
179. Kristen A. Finch, Comment, Lights, Camera, and Actino for Children’s Television v.
FCC: The Story of Broadcast Indecency, Starring Howard Stern, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1275, 1326
(1995) (“In response to public demand for tougher standards of indecency, the Clinton
administration has taken a regulatory point of view.”); The FCC Crackdown: Stern Show, Bono
Cited for Indecency, NEWSDAY, Mar. 19, 2004, at A06 (“The Center for Responsive Politics, a
watchdog group, said fines against Stern accounted for almost half of the $4 million in penalties
proposed by the FCC since 1990.”)
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issued relatively few indecency fines. From 1987 until 1997, the FCC
issued thirty-six fines 180 and from 1997 until the inauguration of George
W. Bush in 2001, the FCC issued sixteen fines. 181 Since 1990, only three
fines have been levied against television broadcasters, representing about
four percent of the total number of indecency fines. 182 During the
Clinton administration, FCC Chairmen Reed Hundt and William
Kennard oversaw some indecency fines, most notably those against
Howard Stern, who settled numerous indecency actions with the FCC for
$1.7 million in 1995. 183 The total amounts of indecency fines remained
relatively constant, however, with total yearly NALs 184 ranging between
$25,500 and $49,000 during the second Clinton administration. 185
With the election of George W. Bush and his subsequent
appointment of Michael Powell as FCC Commissioner, fines levied for
broadcast indecency rose in dramatic fashion. From the beginning of his
term, Powell increased the fine amount in his first year from $48,000 to
$91,000. 186 In 2004, the last full year of his service, the FCC fined
broadcasters an astounding $7,928,080—more than in the ten prior years
combined. 187
This might seem surprising based on Powell’s public statements
prior to becoming chairman. Michael Powell had served as one of the
five FCC Commissioners for four years before President George W.
Bush appointed him chairman. 188 As Commissioner, he expressed a
disinclination to vigorously enforce the indecency prohibitions. In 2001,
he publicly stated that “[i]t is better to tolerate the abuses on the margins
than to invite the government to interfere with the cherished First
180. Milagros Rivera-Sánchez & Michelle Ballard, A Decade of Indecency Enforcement: A
Study of How the Federal Communications Commission Assesses Indecency Fines (1987–1997), 75
JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 143, 146 (1998). According to the FCC data, there were fewer than
sixteen NALs between 1998 and 2000. Between 2001 and 2003, there were seventeen NALs. In
2004, however, there were twelve. Federal Communications Commission, Indecency Complaints
and
NALs:
1993–2005,
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/oip/
ComplStatChart.pdf (last visited Dec. 31, 2005) [hereinafter Indecency Complaints].
181. See Indecency Complaints, supra note 180.
182. Dunbar, supra note 2.
183. Id.
184. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
185. See Federal Communications Commission, Notices of Apparent Liability,
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/broadcast/NAL.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
186. Indecency Complaints, supra note 180.
187. Id.; Dunbar, supra note 2.
188. See Federal Communications Commission, Previous FCC Commissioners,
www.fcc.gov/commissioners/previouscommish.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2005).
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Amendment.” 189 In 1999, he accepted the Media Institute’s Freedom of
Speech Award with a stirring defense of the First Amendment: “We
should think twice before allowing the government the discretion to filter
information to us as they see fit.” 190 As an FCC Commissioner, he said,
“[G]overnment has been engaged for too long in willful denial in order to
subvert the Constitution so that it can impose its speech preferences on
the public—exactly the sort of infringement of individual freedom the
Constitution was masterfully designed to prevent.” 191 Even after he
became Chairman, he said, “I don’t know that I want the government as
my nanny.” 192
But later, Chairman Powell changed his tune. 193 He overcame his
hesitance and compunction about exercising power and eventually
presided over the largest indecency crackdown in FCC history, stating, “I
do not have the luxury of ignoring my duty to enforce the statute because
owners might react with excessive conservatism.” 194
The infamous 2004 Super Bowl halftime wardrobe malfunction—
when Justin Timberlake ripped open Janet Jackson’s bustier to reveal her
right breast—brought indecency to the center of the national political
discussion. The FCC reacted with promises of a thorough investigation—
which resulted in a hefty fine—and more promises of vigilance. 195
Reacting to the public outcry, Congress considered, and is still
considering, numerous bills to significantly stiffen indecency
penalties. 196 Indeed, there is some talk, particularly from Senator Ted
Stevens (R-AK) and FCC Commissioner Kevin Martin, to apply
indecency rules to cable and satellite television as well. 197

189. Powell’s Legacy, KANSAS CITY STAR, Feb. 12, 2004, at H1.
190. Jarvis, supra note 5, at 11.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. See Paul Sweeting, Keeping it Clean, VIDEO BUS., Feb. 11, 2005,
http://www.videobusiness.com/article/CA612072.html (“Although Powell got with the program, he
was always something of a reluctant cultural warrior, having previously expressed uneasiness over
the FCC’s role as censor.”).
194. Jarvis, supra note 5, at 11.
195. Ahrens & Moraes, supra note 179.
196. Communications Daily, Brownback Shipping Indecency Legislation to Senators, (Jan.
26, 2005) 2005 WL 2777507.
197. David Kaplan, Comcast’s Jack of All Trades, Broadcasting and Cable (Apr. 4, 2005)
2005 WLNR 5356069.
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Powell, however, had been pursuing an aggressive stance towards
indecency even before the wardrobe malfunction. 198 One commenter
stated that the incident merely “provided a well-timed boost to the FCC’s
ongoing attempts to enforce indecency regulations more stringently.” 199
A week before the 2004 Super Bowl, the FCC issued a NAL against
Clear Channel Communications for $755,000 because of statements
made by Bubba the Love Sponge, a colorful radio personality. 200
Additionally, on October 2, 2003, the FCC proposed a $357,000 fine
against Infinity Broadcasting Operations, Inc. for an Opie and Anthony
radio show broadcast that included a contest encouraging couples to
engage in sex in public places, like the St. Patrick’s Cathedral. 201 The
Janet Jackson incident, however, led to a tremendous intensification of
enforcement.
Once again, the role of social conservative groups proved central.
The number of complaints skyrocketed from 13,992 in 2002, to 166,683
in 2003, to an astounding 1,405,419 through October 2004, largely due
to the Janet Jackson incident. 202 Some analysts claim that over ninetynine percent of 2004 complaints—barring those involving Jackson—
were sent by the Parents Television Council, a conservative political
group with connections to the Republican Party. 203
Beyond the sheer number and size of Powell’s indecency
enforcements, his administration saw an unprecedented expansion of the
FCC’s authority under § 1464. For instance, during the Golden Globe
award ceremony, which was televised live on January 19, 2003, the
singer Bono used the phrase “f——ing brilliant” when accepting an
award for his song The Hands That Built America. 204 Based on FCC
regulations that define indecency as depicting sexual or excretory organs

198. See Katherine A. Fallow, The Big Chill? Congress and the FCC Crack Down on
Indecency, 22 COMM. LAW., Spring 2004, at 1, 25.
199. Id.
200. Clear Channel Broad. Licenses, Inc., 19 F.C.C.R. 1768 (2004).
201. Infinity Broad. Operations, Inc., 18 F.C.C.R. 19,954 (2003).
202. Federal
Communications
Commission,
Notices
of
Apparent
Liability,
http://www.fcc.gov/eb/broadcast/NAL.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2005); see Indecency Complaints,
supra note 180.
203. Shields, supra note 8, at 4; see also http Indecency Complaints, supra note 180. This
figure is disputed; some claim the figure is only twenty percent. See FCC Complaints Filed by PTC
Members,
CNSNews.com
Information
Services,
Jan.
10
2005,
http://www.cnsnews.com/Culture/archive/200501/CUL20050110g.html.
204. See Susan Crabtree, Congloms to pol pack: Not a f, DAILY VARIETY, Apr. 20, 2004,
available at 2004 WLNR 12542619.
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and dwelling on sexual matters, 205 the FCC’s Enforcement Bureau
initially rejected the resulting indecency complaints on the ground that
one fleeting word could not be indecent. 206 Further, it is hardly clear
from the context that Bono used the work “f——ing” to refer to anything
sexual. Rather, as he used the word, it was probably synonymous with
“very” or “extremely.” The FCC Commissioners, however, rejected the
Enforcement Bureau’s ruling. 207 The Commission ruled that, contrary to
its own precedent, one fleeting use of the word is indecent. It argued that
“given the core meaning of the ‘F-Word,’ any use of that word or a
variation, in any context, inherently has a sexual connotation.” 208 Thus,
the Commission simply disregarded the factor requiring that indecent
programming dwell on sexual or excretory functions.
Even more remarkable, the Commission determined that the
broadcast was profane, which specifically means blasphemous speech in
legal contexts, at least in prior legal pronouncements. 209 The FCC had
rarely, if ever, found licensees liable for profane language. To find
another successful sanction based on profane speech, one has to go to the
FCC’s predecessor, the Federal Radio Commission, and its 1931 action
in Duncan v. United States. 210
The FCC attempted to distinguish this strong precedent in two ways.
First, it muddied the difference between profane and profanity, glibly
stating that “the use of the phrase at issue here in the context and at the
time of day here constitutes ‘profane’ language under 18 U.S.C. §

205. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
206. Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden
Globe Awards” Program, 18 F.C.C.R. 19,859 (2003).
207. Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden
Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. 4975 (2004).
208. Id. at 4978; see also Clay Calvert, Bono, the Culture Wars, and a Profane Decision: The
FCC’s Reversal of Course on Indecency Determinations and Its New Path on Profanity, 28 SEATTLE
U. L. REV. 61, 64–75 (2004).
209. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1226 (7th ed. 1999) (defining profane as “(Of speech or
conduct) irreverent to something held sacred”). The only FCC precedent on the matter reflects this
understanding. See Raycom Am., Inc, 18 F.C.C.R. 4186 (2003) (calling God a “sonofabitch” is not
profane under § 1464) (citing Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720, 725 (9th Cir. 1966) (holding
that “God damn it” is not profane under § 1464); Warren B. Appleton, 28 F.C.C.2d 36 (1971)
(deciding that “damn” is not profane under § 1464)).
210. 48 F.2d 128, 134 (9th Cir. 1931) (upholding conviction under § 1464 for using profane
language where “the defendant . . . referred to an individual as ‘damned,’ . . . used the expression
‘By God’ irreverently, and . . . announced his intention to call down the curse of God upon certain
individuals”).
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1464.” 211 The word “profanity” is commonly defined as “vulgar,
irreverent, or coarse language”; 212 however, the word does not appear in
the statute. As weak support for its position, the FCC relied on a thirtyyear-old opinion, discussing the constitutionality of § 1464’s use of the
terms “indecency and profane.” 213 Second, the FCC relied on an old
precedent defining profanity as a nuisance. In dicta in Tallman v. United
States, the court stated without citation that profane is “construable as
denoting certain of those personally reviling epithets naturally tending to
provoke violent resentment or denoting language which under
contemporary community standards is so grossly offensive to members
of the public who actually hear it as to amount to a nuisance.” 214 Relying
on this precedent, the Commission concluded that Bono’s phrase was
profane “under the Seventh Circuit nuisance rationale. Use of the ‘FWord’ in the context at issue here is also clearly the kind of vulgar and
coarse language that is commonly understood to fall within the definition
of ‘profanity.’” 215 This analysis by the agency constitutes aggressive
statutory interpretation to say the least.
Furthermore, this aggressive interpretation may not be lawful. The
NAL indecency procedure is probably classified as an informal
adjudication and, therefore, the strong rules of precedent applying to
formal adjudication do not apply. An agency is free to ignore its own
precedent, provided it explains its change of policy. 216 As Richard
Pierce states, “The dominant law clearly is that an agency must either
follow its own precedents or explain why it departs from them.” 217
To the extent that informal adjudication does include justifications
for actions, the agency must provide justifications for departures. 218
211. Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden
Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4981.
212. Id. (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1210 (6th ed. 1990)).
213. Id.
214. 465 F.2d 282, 286 (7th Cir. 1972). This definition only had persuasive weight because, as
the court noted, the indictment at issue was for obscenity. Id.
215. Complaints Against Various Broadcast Licensees Regarding Their Airing of the “Golden
Globe Awards” Program, 19 F.C.C.R. at 4981.
216. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807–08
(1973) (asserting adjudicatory decisions “may serve as precedents” and that the agency’s “duty to
explain its departure from prior norms” flows from that presumption).
217. 2 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.5 at 817 (2002); see
also Atchison, 412 U.S. at 807–08; Kelley ex rel. Mich. Dep’t of Natural Res. v. FERC, 96 F.3d
1482, 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“It is, of course, axiomatic that an agency adjudication must either be
consistent with prior adjudications or offer a reasoned basis for its departure from precedent.”).
218. 2 PIERCE, supra note 217, at 820.
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Arguably, the FCC’s decision constitutes a change in the FCC’s
understanding of the words “indecent” and “profane” as established in its
informal adjudication and its informal rulemaking. 219 Such a change
most likely requires further notice and comment. 220
V. A DIFFERENT LOOK AT MEDIA MARKETS
As argued in Part III, the FCC’s regulatory focus stems from almost
a century-old set of assumptions concerning the licensee and the viewer.
What if these assumptions completely miss the mark? What if they
misrepresent or distort the true economic nature of the broadcast market?
This Part sets forth an economic argument that the current set of
regulatory assumptions does miss the mark, failing to account for a key
relationship in broadcast markets between the viewer and the advertiser.
This Part suggests a regulatory regime based upon a more complete
understanding of media markets.
A. Broadcasting: A Two-Sided Market
Many markets, such as advertiser-supported media (like radio and
broadcast television) or credit-card markets, display what economists
term “two-sidedness.” Firms in two-sided markets face two different sets
of consumers, and each set of consumers affects the desirability of the
product for the other set of consumers. For example, consider retailers.
They function within a two-sided market. On one side, they sell goods to
consumers. On the other, they furnish business to credit card companies
by providing a place where consumers use credit cards. 221

219. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
220. Paralyzed Veterans of Am. v. D.C. Arena L.P., 117 F.3d 579, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“To
allow an agency to make a fundamental change in its interpretation of a substantive regulation
without notice and comment obviously would undermine those APA requirements [of informal
rulemaking under section 555 of the APA].”).
221. The number of stores willing to accept a certain bank’s credit card affects the desirability
of that bank’s credit card for shoppers. For example, many shoppers prefer VISA to the Discover
card because of its higher acceptance rate in retail stores. The more stores that accept a bank’s credit
card, the more shoppers want to use that bank’s credit card. On the other side of the market, the
credit card company will seek the greatest number of retailers to honor its card, and the larger the
retailer, the better. A retailer that wishes to maximize its profits will aim to pay a credit-card fee (the
remission a retailer pays to the credit card company) that maximizes profits by balancing both sides
of its market. In other words, firms that face two-sided markets set two different prices, one for each
set of consumers. A decrease in the price to one set of consumers might increase the price to the
other set.
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Radio and broadcast firms must optimize over two markets as well.
The number of viewers that watch a television program affects
advertisers’ demand for commercial time on that program. Clearly,
during its heyday, “Friends” commanded a higher per-minute price for
advertising than the mercifully short-lived “Joey” spin-off. If the
broadcaster sells too much commercial time, however, fewer viewers
will watch even if the show is “Friends.” In other words, a broadcaster of
a popular program must strike a balance between advertisers, who are
anxious to purchase valuable commercial time, and viewers, who may be
driven away if there are too many commercials.
To strike this balance and optimize both sides of the market, the
broadcaster generally charges advertisers an explicit price for
commercial time—i.e., a price for a minute of commercial on a given
show. A television broadcaster also charges viewers an implicit price for
watching—that is, the amount of commercial time that viewers endure.
This amount can be priced relative to each viewer’s opportunity costs. In
other words, the value of the opportunities the viewer foregoes in order
to watch a given commercial is the price he or she pays for a television
show. 222
Simply put, the economics of broadcast television require that
advertisers pay for programming and bundle commercials with the
programming. Viewers pay advertisers for the programming through
their willingness to watch the commercials. In this sense, the broadcaster
is simply a conduit for the exchange between advertisers and viewers. 223
Understanding this relationship between broadcasters, viewers, and
advertisers illustrates that indecency regulation must not focus solely on
the relationship between viewers and programmers, but should also
include the relationship between viewers and advertisers. After all,
broadcasters act as the conduit of exchange between advertisers and
viewers. Involving advertisers in indecency regulation may be just as
important as, if not more important than, involving broadcasters. In
addition, advertisers want viewers who are receptive to their
advertisements. To the extent that advertisers learn which content makes

222. See Stephen Coate & Simon Anderson, Market Provision of Public Goods: The Case of
Broadcasting (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7513, 2000), available at
http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7513.pdf.
223. See generally Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Simple Theory of Advertising as a
Good or Bad, 108 Q.J. ECON. 941 (1993) (demonstrating that this understanding of advertising fits
nicely within neoclassical economics).
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viewers less receptive to their advertisements, advertisers obtain value
from being involved with indecency regulation.
B. Applying a Two-Sided Market Paradigm to Indecency Regulation
As established in Part IV, FCC broadcast regulations have
concentrated on one side of the market: the viewer-broadcaster
relationship. What would the regulations look like if they concentrated
on the other side of the market as well?
Compare broadcast to other two-sided markets like retail and credit
cards. Clearly, there is a functioning competitive market for both retail
and credit cards, and consumers benefit from competition in both
markets. Consumers, to some degree, will make decisions about what
retail firms to patronize based on which credit cards they accept or
whether they accept credit cards at all. For instance, one might not go to
a restaurant that accepts only cash, or might go to a restaurant because it
honors a certain credit card—say one for which the consumer has a
particularly good frequent flyer program.
Does the same thing occur in the broadcast markets? Do individuals,
in fact, make viewing decisions based on which firms advertise on such
programming? Do viewers get anything from advertisers for the value of
their “eyeballs” as consumers do for using particular credit cards?
In other words, if this advertiser information were supplied
inexpensively, would consumers change their viewing (and purchasing)
behavior to “punish” advertisers who support indecent programming in a
way analogous to consumers refusing to patronize certain restaurants that
fail to accept certain credit cards? True, the mere existence of indecent
programming suggests that some segment of the population likes it.
Howard Stern does have a loyal listening audience. However, if there are
enough people who are so offended by Stern that they will boycott his
advertisers, then the viewer-advertiser side of the market is at work.
There are some notable examples of viewer backlash against
advertisers even without a regulatory provision of information. For
instance, Terri Rakolta led a public campaign against the Fox network
television sitcom Married . . . with Children. 224 She viewed an episode
entitled “Her Cups Runneth Over” with her family and found it
particularly objectionable. In response, she pressured the producers of
the show and the Fox network into dropping a few particularly offensive

224. A Mother Is Heard as Sponsors Abandon a TV Hit, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1989, at A1.
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shows. She also targeted the advertisers of the show and was successful
in getting one advertiser to withdraw its support. 225
On her own, Rakolta conducted the research necessary to discover
the firms that advertised on Married . . . with Children. If the FCC
provided viewers with advertiser information in an easily accessible
format—either on the Internet or during the show itself on a digital
television guide—viewers with preferences weaker than Rokalta’s could
communicate their concerns. Advertisers and broadcast programmers
could use this information in selecting desirable programming.
C. The Legality of a Disclosure Regime
The FCC has the authority to mandate that broadcasters provide
information about advertisers who buy commercial time from them. The
broad authority of § 303(j) of the Communications Act of 1934
empowers the Commission to promulgate general rules for broadcasters
and require recordkeeping. 226
Since virtually the beginning of broadcast regulation, the
Commission has required broadcasters to keep information about its
advertisers pursuant to its program log requirements. 227 Broadcasters
maintained detailed records, available for inspection by the public and
the FCC, indicating commercials’ “sponsors . . . along with the time
devoted to the commercial matter in question.” 228
While the program log requirements were largely lifted in the early
1980s, 229 the FCC still has authority, pursuant to the above-mentioned
statutory sections and the broad public trustee obligation, to require
broadcasters to submit advertiser information. The FCC could provide

225. Id.
226. 47 U.S.C. § 303(j) (2000) (stating that the Commission shall “[h]ave authority to make
general rules and regulations requiring stations to keep such records of programs, transmissions of
energy, communications, or signals as it may deem desirable”).
227. The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 94 F.C.C.2d
678, 687–88 (1983) (citing General Order No. 106, 5 FRC Ann. Report 96 (1931)).
228. Petition for Rulemaking To Require Broad. Licensee To Maintain Certain Program
Records, 44 F.C.C.2d 845, 847, ¶ 8 (1974). The programming log rules are found at 47 C.F.R. §§
73.670, 73.674 (2004) (broadcast); id. §§ 73.112, 73.116 (radio AM specific rules); id. §§ 73.282,
73.286 (radio FM specific rules).
229. See The Revision of Programming and Commercialization Policies, Ascertainment
Requirements, and Program Log Requirements for Commercial Television Stations, 98 F.C.C.2d
1076 (1984); Deregulation of Radio, 84 F.C.C.2d 968 (1981) (eliminating program log requirements
for radio).
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this information to consumers in a variety of low-cost ways. For
example, the FCC could collect this information and provide it in a
useful form on the Internet, suitable for easy computer search. 230
As discussed in the following Section, in order for mandated
information disclosure to be efficient, the costs of providing the
information must be sufficiently low. Requiring the FCC to provide
advertiser information on the Internet would satisfy this requirement.
Both the FCC’s costs in providing this information and consumers’ costs
in accessing it would be low. Consumers could visit the FCC website
and, with a relatively simple search, discover which advertisers buy time
on which programs across the country. Such information would empower
consumers to support those programs and advertisers they find
acceptable and punish those advertisers who support programs they find
objectionable.
Posting the information during airtime would likely be too
expensive, but with the widespread adoption of digital television in the
next decade, many viewers will have access to digital, real-time
television guides, known as electronic program guides. These guides
allow viewers, with a few remote-control clicks, to access information
about the programs they are watching. The FCC could certainly require
inclusion of advertiser information on these guides.
D. Specifics of Disclosure Regime
The general proposal to include advertisers in the FCC’s indecency
enforcement can be implemented in a variety of specific ways. This
Article does not advocate one specific implementation method over
another. Instead, it considers two different ways the FCC could
acknowledge the two-sided nature of media markets and leaves the
implementation method to policy makers: replacement or supplementary.
First, the information regime could completely replace the current
enforcement regime. The FCC would get out of the business of issuing
notices of apparent liability and leave the job completely to the market.
The FCC would simply have an informational-regulatory role, mandating
disclosure and providing the data about each program’s advertisers.

230. The FCC has proven its ability to provide the public with large amounts of information in
useful formats. The Taubman Center for Public Policy at Brown University and a team of
researchers examined 1265 state and federal websites and found the FCC’s to be the best. Press
Release, Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n, FCC Website Ranked First in Federal Government (Sept. 18,
2002).

1501

1CANDEUB.FIN.DOC

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

3/14/2006 5:09:54 PM

[2005

Given that broadcasters make their money from selling airtime,
broadcasters’ records of commercial sales would be relatively easy to
produce. The FCC could provide this information on the Internet or
possibly mandate its inclusion on electronic program guides so that it
could be available at the push of a remote control button. The high costs
of tracking advertisers on the thousands of television channels and radio
stations continuously broadcasting in the United States would be
prohibitive to most individuals. Mandated disclosure would clearly lower
information costs.
Second, rather than replacing the FCC’s enforcement regime, the
informational regime could simply supplement the current regime,
allowing both economic and political approaches to indecency
regulation. The FCC would then continue its enforcement regime while
simultaneously providing and disseminating information.
How a policy maker would implement the proposal would turn upon
his or her willingness to embrace market forces and the value he or she
placed on regulatory enforcements. Indeed, market forces would not
necessarily be a panacea. Even though the mandatory disclosure regime
would no doubt reduce transaction and information costs, the regime
would still face considerable collective action problems and challenges.
Further, just as the political process can be captured by particular special
interests, advertisers could be similarly captured or, at least,
intimidated. 231
On the other hand, advertisers are perhaps more resistant to cooption
by a small group than politicians. Advertisers seek to reach the greatest
number of people who might be interested in their product. If this
involves advertising on programs potentially offensive to some
individuals, the firm may not advertise, particularly if those individuals
are well organized. However, the firm may still advertise if its target
audience is greater than those consumers it offends. In the end, the
market limits the effectiveness of any one interest group because the
costs of ignoring the median preferences are too great. Politicians, on the
other hand, can respond to small interest groups almost exclusively
because, if the median preference is sufficiently indifferent to small
interest groups’ concerns, there is no cost. Neither a regulatory
enforcement nor mandated information disclosure regime is perfect. This

231. See
Mike
Moffatt,
The
Logic
of
Collective
Action,
ABOUT.COM,
http://economics.about.com/cs/macroeconomics/a/logic_of_action.htm (quoting MANCUR OLSON,
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 3 (1971)).
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Article does not maintain that an information regime will perfectly
mirror community standards. At the very least, however, it will improve
the process by making it more responsive to consumers and less
responsive to special interest groups.
E. Efficiency and Mandated Disclosure
There are three generally accepted legal rationales behind FCC
broadcast regulation. 232 First, courts rationalized government regulation
because of the scarcity of broadcast spectra. For instance, the Supreme
Court has stated that “[u]nlike other modes of expression, radio
inherently is not available to all. That is its unique characteristic, and that
is why, unlike other modes of expression, it is subject to governmental
regulation.” 233 Second, academics and the FCC have claimed that
broadcast inherently tends towards monopoly or oligopoly. 234 Third,
academics and the FCC have argued that broadcast regulation promotes
First Amendment values through widespread access to media outlets. 235
Another benefit of broadcast regulation that the courts, the FCC, and
legal scholars have overlooked is the possibility that regulation could be
efficiency enhancing by reducing transaction costs. The proposed
regulation would reduce the costs to individuals of discovering and
contacting the firms that advertise on objectionable programs. This
general principle is fairly straightforward. Economic efficiency improves
with increased information; in other words, people will receive more
utility if they have greater knowledge about their purchases and actions.
In this situation, disclosure requirements have the potential to
increase efficiency by increasing the amount of information consumers
have when making viewing decisions. To the degree that individuals
would not watch a show if it were supported by advertisers that
supported objectionable programming, individuals’ choices will be better
with more information. The more individuals know about what programs
advertisers support, the closer their viewing (and buying) behavior will
match their preferences—the standard definition of efficiency. Thus, in
the same way that government-mandated labeling improves efficient

232. MATTHEW L. SPITZER, SEVEN DIRTY WORDS AND SIX OTHER STORIES: CONTROLLING
THE CONTENT OF PRINT AND BROADCAST 28, 43–45 (1986).

233. NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
234. See SPITZER, supra note 232, at 28.
235. See id. at 43–45 (citing Lee Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward
a Theory of Partial Regulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1976)).
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purchases in salad dressing, 236 or that disclosure under the securities
laws encourages efficient investment, 237 labeling and disclosure of
advertisers will encourage efficient media markets. Information
disclosure avoids the difficulty faced by the current regime of trying to
discern a “community standard” based only on preferences of who filed
complaints. The market also has the advantage of more constant
monitoring, as individuals have the incentive to evaluate quality on a
continuing basis.
Theoretical and empirical studies have demonstrated that disclosure
improves efficiency. 238 For instance, government-mandated labeling has
been shown to decrease fat levels in salad dressing. 239 Arguably, once
consumers knew more about what they were buying, they used their
collective bargaining power to get more of what they wanted—salad
dressing that still tastes good, but has less fat. 240
On the other hand, one may wonder why, if the efficiency gains of
disclosure are so manifest, the market does not already provide this
information. Economists have pointed out that consumers have strong
economic incentives to gather information and, conversely, “sellers have
a substantial economic incentive to disseminate information to
consumers.” 241 Given the generally accepted definition of efficiency in
the information market as requiring equality between the expected
marginal social benefits and the marginal cost of information gathering
or information provision—where the marginal social benefit of the
information includes the increment to consumer surplus plus the gain in
sellers’ net revenues—then mandated disclosure runs the risk of being
inefficient on two grounds: (1) government mandates may provide more
than the optimal amount of information or (2) the cost of government-

236. See Alan D. Mathios, The Impact of Mandatory Disclosure on Product Choices: An
Analysis of the Salad Dressing Market, 43 J.L. & ECON. 651, 672 (2000) (demonstrating how
mandatory labeling affects consumer choice and leads to the purchase of more low-fat salad
dressing).
237. Steven L. Schwarcz, Temporal Perspectives: Resolving the Conflict Between Temporal
and Future Investors, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1044, 1044 (2005) (“The fundamental goal of securities law
is to make markets more efficient by providing transparency to investors, thereby reducing
asymmetric information.”).
238. See THOMAS E. COPLAND & J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE
POLICY 196–215 (1st ed. 1976).
239. Mathios, supra note 236, at 665.
240. See id.
241. Howard Beales, Richard Craswell & Steven C. Salop, The Efficient Regulation of
Consumer Information, 25 J.L. & ECON. 491, 502 (1981).
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mandated information may exceed the efficiency gains the information
induces. 242
Beales, Craswell, and Salop identify features in markets that might
result in a sub-optimal amount of information. 243 First, they point to the
“public good” property of information: while information helps
everyone, its benefits are difficult to capture, at least entirely, by the firm
that expended the cost to produce it. 244 This suggests that information
will be under-produced generally in an otherwise competitive
information market. 245
The public-good property of advertising is an example of this
problem. Precisely how would a broadcaster provide information about
all advertisers? To be effective, the broadcaster would have to use
broadcast airtime otherwise devoted to advertising—a clear monetary
loss. Whatever gains it would have, however, would go to all
broadcasters. Thus, any one broadcaster would have a decreased
incentive to provide such information in a competitive environment.
Further, even if a broadcaster did provide information, it would also
experience free-rider problems, as other broadcasters would no longer
have an incentive to provide information, thus leaving one broadcaster
with all the cost and only some of the benefit.
Media markets tend to encourage producer output that caters to
average tastes. Consider the following. Assume there are three available
programs—a baseball game, an opera, and a play—and three types of
viewers. Further assume that 1,000 viewers like the baseball game, 200
viewers like the opera, and 100 viewers like the play. Finally, assume
there are three channels. Peter Steiner famously indicated that producers
cater to the average taste. 246 For example, three competitors would all
duplicate the baseball game, because the baseball game could attract 333
viewers for each of the three channels, which is more than the 200
viewers that would watch an opera or the 100 viewers that would watch a
play. 247

242. Id.
243. Id. at 503–13.
244. Id. at 503.
245. Steve Salop, Information and Monopolistic Competition, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 240 (1976).
246. Peter O. Steiner, Program Patterns and Preferences, and the Workability of Competition
in Radio Broadcasting, 66 Q.J. ECON. 194 (1952).
247. Id. at 217. Steiner’s discussion of listener maximization formed the basis for the baseball
analogy in the text.
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Mandating disclosure of additional information about advertising
would create smaller audiences for any given program. For example, it is
possible that 1,000 viewers would watch the baseball game, ignorant of
its advertisers. Suppose, however, that 990 viewers would watch the
baseball game if they knew that an advertising sponsor of the baseball
game, say Gillette, also advertised on the Howard Stern Show. A
monopolistic firm would have to put on two baseball games—one
sponsored by Gillette and the other sponsored by advertisers acceptable
to the offended ten viewers—in order to capture these viewers. Thus, the
added information simply adds cost to the firm without necessarily
increasing viewership.
Indeed, this same mechanism might also prevent the industry as a
whole, through trade associations like the National Association of
Broadcasters, from providing such information. Advertising information
would have the tendency to decrease viewership for any particular
program. In order to retain viewership, broadcasters would need to show
two baseball games with acceptable advertisers to two groups of
viewers—rather than one baseball game which would have been
acceptable to all without the advertiser information. Thus, industry-wide
advertising would likely simply raise costs without increasing
viewership. Clearly, there would be no incentive for industry groups to
engage in such a campaign. Given the market incentive to produce too
little information about advertisers, government mandated disclosure—
particularly the low cost one advocated for here—would be appropriate.
F. Better Reflection of Community Standards and Preferences
Further, a market-based approach would better reflect a regional
community’s standards in comparison to the FCC’s single national
standard. The Commission uses a community standard that is not regionspecific but reflects “an average broadcast viewer or listener” in the
United States. 248 It is not clear why the FCC adopts a national standard
when the Supreme Court accepts a regional approach for obscenity; 249
certainly, the FCC would be constitutionally permitted to adopt a
regional approach. Further, the current FCC’s attempts to define a
national community standard are confounded by this country’s large
geographical and cultural diversity.
248. 2001 Policy Statement, 16 F.C.C.R. 8002 (2001).
249. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 573–75 (2002) (discussing the “community standard,”
which seems to imply a regional approach).
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Of course, a regional approach to indecency regulation would be a
tremendous administrative burden. While it is fairly uncontroversial that
community standards are quite different in the Castro district of San
Francisco than in suburban Salt Lake City, defining these differences in a
useful way for workable administrative standards would require a
massive sociological inquiry and legal effort. Given the vagueness of the
indecency standard itself, such an inquiry might be impossible. It is
certainly beyond the resources of the FCC.
On the other hand, a market-based approach to indecency regulation
could easily enforce more localized standards. Given that radio and
television spectrums are locally licensed, advertisements on many
broadcasts are locally bought and sold. 250 Advertisers, therefore, could
withhold support for programs that would be indecent or otherwise
objectionable in suburban Salt Lake City, but hardly risqué in San
Francisco. Further, nationally purchased advertising could be tailored to
different localities.
Unlike the current, centralized FCC approach that dictates
“community standards” from inside the Beltway, which often reflects
political compromise or signaling between politicians and special
interests, a market-based approach would more likely reflect
communities’ tastes and preferences. Also, unlike bureaucrats and FCC
political appointees, who have a clear incentive to cater to political and
industry interests, advertisers would have a clear economic incentive to
avoid sponsoring programs that would offend a significant portion of
their community’s viewing audience. Such a result enhances efficiency
because advertisers would have the incentive to respond to real
preferences, not simply bureaucratic approximated guesses or political
compromises purporting to reflect community preferences.
G. Civic Society and Community Standards
The current FCC regulatory approach deters civic involvement in
important community decisions. Numerous political scientists and legal
scholars, often identified as civic republicans, evaluate laws and political
systems for the extent to which they encourage or discourage discussion
of important issues and widespread, broad-based involvement in political

250. Advertisers contract, therefore, in large part with the local broadcast stations, or at the
very least, on a regional level.
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dialogue. 251 It is thought that such a dialogue will help clarify the basic
principles of society, improve those principles, and, perhaps more
importantly, produce better citizens. In other words, through continued
meaningful involvement in politics, we graduate, so to speak, from the
sordid squabbles of high school student government into the organic,
profound political reflection that elevates both the state and the
individual.
Regardless of one’s views on civic republicanism, it is clear that the
current regulatory approach towards obscenity retards the development
of civic society and civic republican virtues. What is particularly striking
about the decency standards is that although they purport to reflect
community standards, they are more often about Beltway politics and
legal arguments. Individuals and individual communities have little input
into decency standards in their communities. Rather, communities tend
to sit back and simply wait and see whether the FCC will take action
against a particular shock jock or enjoy the spectacle of politicians
falling over each other to denounce Janet Jackson in the most vociferous
manner.
A market-based approach, on the other hand, would encourage and
empower a discussion about what community standards should be for
broadcast. It would lower the costs for the would-be Terry Rakolta. More
people would be able to pressure producers and present arguments to
their fellow citizens about the benefits and costs of more restrictive
broadcast indecency rules. Those who enjoy Married . . . with Children
could present their arguments about why the show is worthy of advertiser
support and those who oppose it could do the same. This is precisely the
type of discussion about indecency that our civic discourse lacks.
H. Cost of Disclosure
Finally, any benefits of this regime must be balanced against its
costs. Regulation that is so costly that it outweighs its benefits generally
cannot be defended. Here, the cost is minimal. As discussed above,
broadcasters already keep track of program advertisers. 252 The FCC
would merely have to require that this information be made available on

251. See Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court 1985 Term—Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17–19 (1986); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican Revival,
97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1541 (1988); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29, 31 (1985).
252. See supra notes 226–30 and accompanying text.
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the Internet and perhaps provide a master webpage to assist people in
finding particular local broadcasters.
I. Beyond Indecency
Currently, the FCC indecency regulation prohibits only indecent
material (i.e., material that involves sexual or excretory organs). 253
Many believe that other types of programming, particularly violent
programming, has a negative effect on children, yet the FCC has no
authority to directly regulate violent content. 254
The closest the FCC has come to regulating violence is the 1996
Telecommunications Act mandate that V-chips be installed in all
television sets “shipped in interstate commerce or manufactured in the
United States.” 255 These chips can read ratings embedded in
programming content and screen out programs with ratings viewers do
not want to see. Thus, if a program identifies itself as having more
violence than the amount set by the viewer, it will be blocked. Due to
First Amendment concerns, the Act did not mandate that broadcasters
label their programming; rather, Congress encouraged them to do so. 256
The V-chip’s effectiveness has been questionable. As Thomas
Hazlett wrote, “[T]he joke has always been that mom and dad will be
unable to deploy any filtering device that requires programming skills
without persuading their 10-year old to show them how.” 257 Moreover, a
recent study by the Annenberg Center suggests that the overwhelming
majority of families would not use the V-chip even if given extensive
technical support. 258
This Article’s approach provides another mechanism for advocates
of violence regulation—a mechanism that allows consumers to put

253. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
254. See KEVIN W. SAUNDERS, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT 146–
63 (2003).
255. 47 U.S.C. § 303(x) (2000). (requiring that an apparatus designed to receive television
signals should be equipped with a feature “designed to enable viewers to block display of all
programs with a common rating” ).
256. Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1490, 1544 n.294 (2005).
257. Thomas Hazlett, Requiem for the V-Chip: A Relic of the Last Battle over Indecency on
TV, SLATE, Feb. 13, 2004, http://slate.msn.com/id/2095396.
258. AMY JORDAN & EMORY WOODARD, PARENTS’ USE OF THE V-CHIP TO SUPERVISE
CHILDREN’S TELEVISION USE (The Annenberg Public Policy Center, 2003), available at
http://www.annenbergpublicpolicycenter.org/05_media_developing_child/childrensprogramming/20
03_Parentsuseofvchip.pdf.
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pressure directly on content producers and does not rely on individuals’
abilities to program their VCRs and TIVOs.
J. Response to Objection
An objection immediately arises from this Article’s proposal. Civil
libertarians might object because it gives too much power to specific
groups of consumers. Particular groups, say armies of Terry Rakoltas and
organizations like Morality in Media, might be empowered to limit or
eliminate types of programming enjoyed by minorities of the viewing
public. Thus, the proposal would decrease media diversity and arguably
censor speech.
This criticism rings hollow, however, because the market already
censors speech. As A.J. Liebling quipped, “[F]reedom of the press is
guaranteed only to those who own one.” 259 A basic truth in our society is
that those who own a media outlet determine the content of broadcast
programming. Conversely, to the degree that the media properties are
valuable assets, their owners will generally select programming that
maximizes profits derived from such assets.
As discussed in Section V, broadcasters that wish to maximize profit
often have an incentive to cater to average tastes. Presumably, this does
not violate civil libertarian principles. Indeed, the civil libertarian
objection goes too far because, taken to its logical extension, it would
prohibit private ownership of media. Rather, this Article’s proposal
merely advances more efficient functioning in the media market, which
civil libertarians generally accept, despite its potential to reduce
programming diversity.
VI. CONCLUSION
The history of recent indecency enforcement is the story of
politicization of legal standards. The FCC has not only failed to
promulgate clear standards, it has muddied the waters with haphazard
interpretations and enforcements. Delegating authority to administrative
agencies always carries risk of politicization and slanted enforcement,
but these risks are particularly undesirable when First Amendment values
are on the line. Moreover, when the law is unclear, broadcasters will err
on the side of caution, self-censoring perfectly legal speech.

259. Abbott Joseph Liebling, Do You Belong in Journalism?, NEW YORKER, May 4, 1960.

1510

1CANDEUB.FIN.DOC

1463]

3/14/2006 5:09:54 PM

The Law and Economics of Wardrobe Malfunction

This Article suggests a new approach to indecency regulation that
seeks to enhance efficiency on a side of the media market that regulators
have previously ignored—the viewer-advertiser relationship—by
lowering information costs for viewers. Such information-based
regulation holds the promise of providing decency standards that are
more genuinely reflective of local community standards than the FCC’s
national community standard. Further, the proposed regime could be
responsive to other objectionable, potentially damaging material, such as
violent programming, that present FCC regulations largely ignore. The
proposed regulation has minimal costs and would simply involve a wider
dissemination of information about advertisers and programming—
information that broadcasters already record and track. Dissemination of
this information could be made on the Internet easily and cheaply.
Finally, this proposal would return the debate about community
standards to the people, empowering them to carry on the public
discussion, rather than enabling an agency with its too often politicized
discretion.
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